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WHO MADE THAT?: INFLUENCING
FOREIGN LABOUR PRACTICES
THROUGH REFLEXIVE DOMESTIC
DISCLOSURE REGULATION©
DAVID

J. DOOREY*

An important tool of "decentred" regulation,
including reflexive law, is corporate information
disclosure. Disclosure regulation can have an
important normative influence on corporate behaviour
because it introduces a risk element that must be
managed by corporate leaders. The challenge for
regulators is to identify the scope of disclosure that will
cause corporate responses of the sort desired by the
state. This article considers the potential role of
disclosure regulation as a tool for influencing labour
practices beyond the borders of the regulating state
and, in particular, within the vast global supply chains
of multinational corporations. In the context of
improving labour practices in developing states, the
goal of regulation must be foremost the empowerment
of the workers and their organizations in those states,
and of the indigenous and emerging global social
movements that assist them. The article examines
three recent proposals for mandatory disclosure of
information about global labour practices, and
concludes that the least ambitious of them (disclosure
of factory addresses) may contribute to this goal more
effectively than broader proposals that seek to inject
raw information about actual labour practices into the
consumer and investor markets of advanced economic
states.

La divulgation des informations des soci6t6s
repr6sente un outil important d'une r6glementation
.decentralise,.
y compris du droit
r6fl6chi.
R6glementer la divulgation peut exercer une grande
influence normative sur le comportement des soci6t6s,
parce que cela introduit un 616ment de risque, que
doivent g6rer les chefs de soci6t6s. Le d6fi, pour les
autorit6s de r6glementation, consiste A d6finir A quel
point la divulgation provoquera des rdactions des
soci6t6s, du genre que souhaite ltat. Cet article
r6fl6chit au r6le 6ventuel que remplirait la
r6glementation sur la divulgation, s'il faut influencer
les pratiques de travail par-delA les fronti~res de l'tat
codificateur et en particulier, au sein des vastes
chaines
d'approvisionnement
plan6taires
des
multinationales. Dans le contexte d'une am6lioration
les pratiques de travail des Etats en voie de
d6veloppement, le but de la r~glementation doit tre
avant tout la prise de pouvoir des travailleurs et de
leurs organismes dans ces tats, et les mouvements
sociaux locaux naissants dans le monde, qui se tierment
A leurs c6t6s. L'article examine trois propositions
r6centes visant la divulgation obligatoire
de
renseignements relatifs aux pratiques de travail
mondiales, et arrive A la conclusion que la moins
ambitieuse d'entre elles (divulgation de radresse des
usines) peut mieux contribuer A cet objectif que les
propositions A caractre plus ambitieux, qui cherchent
A d~verser, sur les march6s de consommation et
d'investissement des Etats dconomiques 6volu6s, des
renseignements sans indulgence sur les v6ritables
pratiques de travail.
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Frequent reports of punishing labour conditions endured by
workers employed throughout the global supply chains of multinational
corporations (MNCs) have, in recent years, energized campaigns by non-

state actors that aim to shame MNCs into taking responsibility for the
labour practices under which their products are made. These campaigns
have influenced many MNCs to adopt private codes of conduct through
which they propose to enforce compliance by their suppliers with
specified labour standards.' Presumably, these corporations are
engaging in risk management in response to a perceived increase in
demand by their customers or shareholders to avoid the taint of
products, made under "sweatshop" conditions. Broad-based public

acceptance of many of these voluntary corporative initiatives is
impeded, however, by a continued lack of transparency. Some
corporations have responded to public pressures by agreeing to disclose
the names and addresses of their factories and suppliers or the results of
"social" audits of those factories. 2 Nevertheless, most corporations still
'See Sol Picciotto, "Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business"
(2003) 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 131 at 139; Virginia Haulfler, A Public Role for the Private
Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2001); Claire Moore Dickerson, "Transnational Codes of
Conduct Through Dialogue: Leveling the Playing Field For Developing Workers" (2001) 53
Fla. L. Rev. 611; Harry Arthurs, "Private Ordering and Workers' Rights in the Global
Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation" in Joanne
Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl & Karl Klare, eds., Labour Law in an Era of Globalization:
Transformative Practices and Possibilities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 471
[Arthurs, "Corporate Codes"]; Olivier Boiral, "The Certification of Corporate Conduct: Issues
and Prospects" (2002) 142 Int'l Labour Rev. 317; and Rhys Jenkins, "The Political Economy of
Codes of Conduct" in Rhys Jenkins, Ruth Pearson & Gill Seyfang, eds., Corporate
Responsibility and Labour Rights." Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy (London:
Earthscan, 2002) 13.
2 The most notable example is the decision of Nike, Inc. ("Nike") in April 2005 to disclose
on its corporate website the names and addresses of its 700 supplier factories that make Nike
branded
products.
See
"Active
Factories,"
online:
<http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/
nikebiz.jhtml?page=25&cat=activefactories>. Other companies, such as Jansport and Gear, had
been voluntarily disclosing their factory locations on their websites for several years. Nike had in
the past refused to disclose its factory locations, arguing that this information was "intellectual
property" that needed to be kept from its competitors. See Maria Gillen, "The Apparel Industry
Partnership's Free Labor Association: A Solution to the Overseas Sweatshop Problem or the
Emperor's New Clothes?" (2000) 32 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1059 at 1097 and 1097, n. 138. Other
companies, including Timberland and Levi-Strauss, have since followed Nike's lead and have
disclosed their factory locations. Links to all of the companies that disclose their factory addresses
can now be found on the website of the International Textile and Garmets Workers Federation,
online:
< http://www.itglwf.org/displaydcoument.asp?Index= 1158&Language = EN&DocType
=Links>. In addition, many MNCs that sell clothing to U.S. and Canadian universities have agreed
to the demand of the Students Against Sweatshops campaign to provide the factory locations of
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refuse to disclose information about which employees make their
products and the conditions under which those workers were employed.3
The veil of secrecy that shields the employment practices within
global supply chains from public scrutiny has attracted growing criticism
in recent years, manifested in a plethora of proposals for increased
transparency of global labour practices. Activist shareholders and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have challenged corporations to
become more transparent about the labour practices within their
production chains;4 politicians have proposed laws that would require
greater transparency of labour practices information as a condition for
preferred trade status; 5 international institutions have proposed

contractors, and this information is disclosed on the website of Worker Rights Consortium. See
"About the Factory Disclosure Database," online: <http://www.workersrights.org/aboutfdd.asp>.
The Fair Labor Association, and some of its member corporations individually, also recently began
to disclose incidents of non-compliance with its code of conduct by participating companies and
licensees. See <http://www.fairlabor.org/all/transparency/charts2002.html>. In The Gap's "2003
Social Responsibility Report," the company disclosed for the first time a breakdown of violations of
the labour components of its code of conduct by country (though not by factory). See
<http://www.gapinc.com/socialresp/socialresp.htm>. Social Accountability International lists the
addresses of factories receiving SA8000 accreditation on their website. See "SA8000 Certified
<http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
online:
September 2005),
Facilities" (13
document.showDocumentBylD&nodelD= 1&DocumentlD=60>.
' The Retail Council of Canada argues that even information about the identity and
location of suppliers is proprietary and should not be subject to mandatory disclosure. See Sharon
A. Maloney, General Counsel and Senior Vice-President, Government Relations, "Submission to
the Public Policy Forum Consultation on a Proposal (and its Alternatives) to Verify Labour
online:
2003),
September
(26
Industry"
Apparel
the
in
Standards
<www.ppforum.ca/textilelabelling/cRetail_Council of Canada.pdf> at 10. See also Gillen, ibid,.
and see: Roots, Open Letter to Customers, online: <http://www.roots.com/newcanada
/html/propenletter.shtml >.
' Examples of NGO-led initiatives include: Ethical Trading Action Group, "Coming Clean
on the Clothes We Wear: Transparency Report Card" ranking fifty companies on the level of
< http://www.maquilasolidarity.org
online:
practices,
labour
to
relating
disclosure
/campaigns/reportcard/>; the International Right-to-Know campaign for legislation requiring U.S.based companies to disclose a broad range of information about their labour and environmental
practices (online: <http://www.irtk.org/>); the U.S. National Labor Committee's proposal to
amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to require public disclosure of information, including factory
addresses (online: <http:/iwww.nlcnet.org/news/public/files-upload/Legislation.pdf>); a similar
initiative of Corporate Sunshine Working (online: <http://www.corporatesunshine.org/>); and the
Ethical Trading Action Group's disclosure campaign, which is discussed later in this article. For a
summary of recent shareholder proxies and resolutions, see e.g. the Investor Responsibility
Research Center, CorporateSocialIssues Reporter(August/September 2004).
' An example is the Corporate Codes of Conduct Act, H.R. 4596 (Rep. McKinney),
introduced 7 June 2000. See Mark B. Baker, "Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and
the Multinational Enterprise" (2001) 20 Wis. Int'l L.J. 89 at 112.
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voluntary codes for MNCs that include transparency requirements; 6 and
academics have made a variety of proposals for greater disclosure of
labour practices information.7
These proposals implicitly engage the literature on "decentred"

regulation, an approach that assumes that the state can influence
normative practices indirectly by shaping the context in which society's

various actors and subsystems interact and bargain with one another.8
Of particular relevance is the theory of "reflexive law," developed
primarily by Gunther Teubner.9 Reflexive law encourages the state to
influence the development of privately produced normative systems and

practices

by

influencing

communications

between

institutions

intermediary to the state and free markets.

The recent proposals for mandatory disclosure of information
about global labour practices take the notion of a decentred state to a
different level. The theory is that a state can influence through indirect
means the practices of multinational private actors beyond the borders
of the regulating state. The principal regulatory tool to accomplish this
task is mandatory disclosure of information about the foreign practices
of the multinational actor. These models recognize that new

communications

technologies

permit

information

to be

shared

instantaneously by a myriad of private actors dispersed around the
globe. Therefore, information disclosed in one regulating state cannot

be contained within the borders of that state. This has implications for
the multinational actor, Which must reflect upon how the information
will be received by actors across the planet and how it may be used by

6 See e.g. the United Nation's Global Compact, which requests that signatory companies
disclose in their annual reports a "Communication on Progress," which the UN recommends should
comply with the reporting requirements designed by the GlobalReporting Initiative(GRI). The GRI
reporting framework includes a variety of labour and employment indicators. See
<http://www.globalreporting.org/guidelines/2002/c52.asp>.

'See Part V.
'See Julia Black, "Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and SelfRegulation in a 'Post-Regulatory' World" (2001) 53 Curr. Legal Probs. 103 [Black, "Decentring
Regulation"]; Julia Black, "Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I" (2000) 20 Oxford. J. Legal Stud.
597 [Black, "Proceduralizing Regulation"].
' See "Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law" (1983) 17 Law & Soc'y. Rev.
239 [Teubner, "Reflexive Elements"]; "After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of PostRegulatory Law" in Gunther Teubner, ed., Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 1985) 299 [Teubner, "After Legal Instrumentalism"]; Law as an Autopoietic System
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) [Teubner, Autopoietic System].
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antagonistic forces to harm or impede its own internal goals and
objectives. In theory, requiring transparency about global labour
practices could contribute to a climate in which the worst employers are
punished, and the best rewarded. This could in turn contribute to the
creation of a normative system of labour practices that encourages
improved labour practices outside of formal regimes of state-based or
supranational substantive labour standards.
But significant obstacles impede designers of a model of
mandatory disclosure of global labour practices. If poorly designed or
implemented, such a model is likely to lead to unintended consequences
that could leave the workers who are the intended beneficiaries even
worse off than they are at present. Indeed, this is a problem with many
forms of reflexive or decentred regulation, as it is with market-based
approaches to regulation. The outcomes of the interactions the models
seek to facilitate are unpredictable, and the governance mechanisms are
imprecise. When the regulation is intended to influence private conduct
in another sovereign state, particular caution must be exercised so that
the legitimate exercise of that state's right to shape its own domestic
policies is not undermined.
This article considers these issues in reference to three recent
proposals to require MNCS to disclose information relating to labour
practices within their global supply chains: (1) the "Ratcheting Labour
Standards" (RLS) model of Charles Sabel, Dara O'Rourke and Archon
Fung;1 ° (2) Cynthia Williams' proposal to require disclosure of labour
practices information within the scheme of U.S. securities law; 1 and (3)
a proposal by a Canadian NGO, the Ethical Trading Action Group
(ETAG), which would require disclosure only of the factory locations at
12
which apparel imported to Canada was made.

"Charles Sabel, Dara O'Rourke, and Archon Fung have produced a number of papers in
which they develop their RLS model, including: "Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for
Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace," online: Columbia Law School
&
Fung,
[Sabel,
O'Rourke
<http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/ratchPO.html>
"Ratcheting"]; and "Realizing Labor Standards" in Sabel, O'Rourke & Fung, eds., Can We Put an
End to Sweatshops?[An End to Sweatshops.] (New Democracy Forum Series, Joshua Cohen &
Joel Rogers, eds. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) 3 [Sabel, O'Rourke & Fung, "Realizing"].
" Cynthia Williams, "The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency" (1999) 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197.
12 The Maquila Solidarity Network, an NGO that acts as the Secretariat for ETAG, includes
on its website links to all of the various documents related to ETAG's disclosure campaign. See
<http://www.maquilasolidarity.org/campaigns/disclosure/
online:
"Disclosure
Campaign"
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Part I provides an overview of an emerging pluralist vision for
the development of a normative model of global labour standards that
draws upon the contribution of non-state actors and forces. In Part II, I
review more carefully the literature on the contribution of "decentred"
and reflexive law, and consider its potential contribution to this pluralist
vision. Part III examines the role of information disclosure as a
regulatory tool for influencing corporate conduct. The particular
challenges of designing an effective disclosure regime are then
considered in Part IV, with an emphasis on the challenges that are most
relevant to a potential disclosure model addressing global labour
standards. Part V reviews the three proposals for mandatory disclosure
of labour practices. Finally, in Part VI, I evaluate these proposals in
light of the earlier observations about the challenges of designing an
effective disclosure model of this sort.
I.

A PLURALIST
STANDARDS

VISION FOR NORMATIVE

LABOUR

Much of the globalization literature describes an enfeebled
state, hobbled by the forces of economic globalization and
regionalization.t3 In labour law, the argument takes a distinct and now
familiar form.'4 The general thesis is that a confluence of factors,

index.htm>. See also D.J. Doorey, "Disclosure of Factory Locations in Global Supply Chains: A
Canadian Proposal to Improve Global Labour Practices" (2005) 55 Can. Rev. Soc. Pol'y 104.
"The literature is extensive. Examples include: Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty
in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Boaventura de Sousa
Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic
Transition (London: Routledge, 1995); Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996); David Held et al, eds., Global Transformations: Politics,
Economics and Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Christoph Schreuer, "The
Waning of the Sovereign Sate: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law" (1993) 4 E.J.I.L.
447; and Robert Wai, "Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of.
Private International Law in an Era of Globalization" (2002) 40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 209.
4
H.W. Arthurs, "Labour Law Without the State" (1995) 46 U.T.L.J. 1 [Arthurs, "Without
the State"]; David M. Trubek, Jim Mosher & Jeffrey S. Rothstein, "Transnationalism in the
Regulation of Labor Relations: International Regimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks"
(2000) Law & Soc. Inquiry 1187; Sabel, O'Rourke & Fung, "Realizing," supra note 10; Bob Hepple,
"New Approaches to International Labor Regulation" (1994) 26 Indus. L.J. 353 [Hepple, "New
Approaches"]; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, "Labour and the Global Economy: Four Approaches
to Transnational Labor Regulation" (1995) 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 987; Adelle Blackett, "Global
Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentred State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of
Corporate Conduct" (2001) 8 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 401; Steven R. Ratner, "Corporations and
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including advances in communications technology and the liberalization

of regional and international trade and capital, "'compress time and
space" by permitting instantaneous transactions and complex global

production networks of contractors and subcontractors to flourish.15
These developments alter power relations within states in favour of

corporate interests, particularly those of large MNCs, because they at
once facilitate the option of "exit"16 by capital as a strategic response to
rising labour costs, and weaken unions and governments, the traditional
countervailing actors to corporate power. 7 Labour law's traditional role
in the pursuit of countervailing power to corporations 8 is strained as a

result, as a new emphasis on maintaining a "business friendly,"
competitive environment relative to other jurisdictions begins to
dominate policy discourse. 9

The spectre of a multinational "regulatory race to the bottom"
in labour standards resulting from this competition has fuelled debate
over the desirability and potential form of new models of supranational
labour law. The argument for enforceable supranational labour
standards has thus far attracted little state support, and has been

Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility" (2001) 111 Yale L.J. 443; and Ozay Mehmet,
Errol Mendes & Robert Sinding, Towards a Fair Global Labour Market: Avoiding the New Slave
Trade (London: Routledge, 1999).
I' Ibid. On "time-space compression" see e.g. Santos, supra note 13 at 85-98; William E.
Scheuerman, "Global Law in Our High-Speed Economy" in Richard P. Applebaum, William L.F.
Festiner & Volkmar Gessner, eds., Rules and Networks. The Legal Culture of Global Business
Transactions (Oxford: Hart, 2003) 103 [Scheuerman, "High-Speed Economy"]; Manuel Castells,
The Rise of the Network Society (Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 1996); and Erica Schoenberger,
"Competition, Time, and Space in Industrial Change" in Gary Gereffi & Miguel Korzeniewicz,
eds., Commodity Chainsand GlobalCapitalism (Westport, CT: Preager, 1994).
16 Eyal Benvenisti, "Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization" (1999) 98 Mich. L. Rev.
167; Gerald Epstein, "International Capital Mobility and the Scope for National Economic
Management" in Robert Boyer & Daniel Drache, eds., States Against the Market: The Limits of
Globalization(London: Routledge, 1996) 211.
7
l Arthurs, "Without the State," supra note 14; Harry W. Arthurs, "The Collective Labour
Law of a Global Economy" in Chris Engels & Manfred Weiss, eds., Labour Law and Industrial
Relations at the Turn of the Century (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) 143 [Arthurs,
"Collective Labour Law"]; Harry Arthurs, "Landscape and Memory: Labour Law, Legal Pluralism,
and Globalization" in Ton Wilthagen, ed., Advancing Theory in Labour Law and Industrial
Relations in a Global Context (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van
Wetenschappen, 1998); Hepple, "New Approaches," supra note 14; and Stone, supra note 14.
Otto Kahn-Freund, Labourand the Law (London: Stevens for the Hamlyn Trust, 1972).

/ 9 Arthurs, "Collective Labour Law," supra note 17 at 154; Hugh Collins, "Regulating for
Competitiveness" (2001) 30 Indus. L.J. 17.
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soundly rejected by developing states that view such proposals as thinlydisguised Northern protectionism. 20 Renewed energy and purpose at the

International Labour Organization (ILO), culminating in a "retreat, 21 to
"core" standards, has not resulted in any greater sanctioning powers
being conferred on the ILO, with the result that it remains an institution
promulgating voluntary standards that are routinely violated by states.
Efforts to link trade benefits to compliance with labour rights through a
"social clause" in trade agreements, most notably the World Trade

Organization (WTO) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),

have failed under the weight of opposition from developing

countries. 22 Furthermore, existing forms of transnational labour
regulation, most notably within the European Community and the
Labour Side Agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) have, thus far, been modest in the realm of labour law, failing,
for example, to guarantee enforceable rights to freedom of association
and collective bargaining.2 3
The relative dearth of new regimes of formal, state-created
supranational labour law should not, however, be equated with an

20 Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, "Rights vs. Efficiency? The Economic Case for
Transnational Labour Standards" (1994) 23 Indus. L.J. 289; Brian Alexander Langille, "General
Reflections on the Relationship of Trade and Labor (Or: Fair Trade as Free Trade's Destiny)" in
Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization:Prerequisitesfor
Free Trade? vol. 2 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996) 231; and Kaushik Basu, "Compacts,
Conventions, and Codes" (2001) 34 Cornell Int'l L.J. 487 [Basu, "Compacts"].
2
Hepple, "New Approaches," supra note 14 at 358.

z Elisabeth Cappuyna, "Linking Labor Standards and Trade Sanctions: An Analysis of
their Current Relationship" (1998) 36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 659; Erika De Wet, "Labor
Standards in a Globalized Economy: The Inclusion of a Social Clause in the General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade/World Trade Organization" (1995) 17 Hum. Rts. Q. 443; Lance Compa, "...And
the Twain Shall Meet? A North-South Controversy Over Labor Rights and Trade" (1995) 23 Lab.
Res. Rev. 51; Virginia Leary, "The WTO and the Social Clause: Post Singapore" (1997) 8 E.J.I.L.
118; Gijsbert van Liemt, "Minimum Labor Standards and International Trade: Would A Social
Clause Work?" (1989) 128 Int'l Lab. Rev. 443; and Steve Charnovitz, "The Influence of
International Labor Standards on the World Trade Regime: A Historical Overview" (1987) 126
Int'l Lab. Rev. 565.
Catherine Barnard, European Community Employment Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000). A number of authors emphasize that the benefits of NAFrA's labour side
agreement (the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation, "NAALC") include its
potential to encourage cross-border co-operation by unions and labour activists, as well as its
"spotlight" effect, which may build pressure on companies and states to improve labour practices.
See e.g. Lance Compa, "NAFTA's Labor Side Accord: A Three Year Accounting" (1997) 3 NAFTA
L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 6; Roy J. Adams & Parbudyal Singh, "Early Experience with NAFrA's Labour
Side Accord" (1997) 18 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 364.
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absence of global labour law. As Teubner and others have observed, in
the sphere of labour, as in other legal sectors, new forms of "global law"
are emerging "in 'relative insulation' from the state, official
international politics and international public law. ' 2, 4 These nascent
forms of global labour law take as their target of governance not states,

but the giant MNCS that are perceived to be in a position to address and
improve global labour standards through direct intervention and
through leadership in the pursuit of "best practices." Therefore, in the
search for a burgeoning global labour law, it is an error to focus solely
on the actions of states and the international institutions they have
created. Corporate codes of conduct, 25 international framework
agreements between MNCs and international union federations,26
internal works councils or committees 27 adopted by MNCs, and corporate
campaigns waged by NGOs and social and worker activists may all
influence normative labour practices quite apart from the state.

24 Gunther Teubner, "Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society" in Gunther
Teubner, ed., Global Law Without a State (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1997) at 3, reference
omitted [Teubner, "Global Bukowina"]. See also Trubek, Mosher & Rothstein, supra note 14;
Santos, supra note 13; Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law in a World of Liberal States"
(1995) 6 E.J.I.L. 538; Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1990); and Arthurs, "Collective Labour Law," supra note 17.
a' Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchcliffe-Darricarr~re, "Enforcing Labor Rights Through
Corporate Codes of Conduct" (1995) 33 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 663; Jorge F. Perez-Lopez,
"Promoting International Respect for Worker Rights through Business Codes of Conduct" (1993)
17 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1; Arthurs, "Corporate Codes," supra note 1; Dickerson, supra note 1; Neil
Gunningham & Joseph Rees, "Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective" (1997) 19
Law & Pol'y. 363; Bob Hepple, "A Race to the Top? International Investment Guidelines and
Corporate Codes of Conduct" (1999) 20 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 350; Neal Kearney, "Corporate
Codes of Conduct: The Privatized Application of Labour Standards" in Sol Picciotto & Ruth
Mayne, eds., Regulating InternationalBusiness.-Beyond Liberalization (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1999) 205; and Michael Posner & Justine Nolan, "Can Codes of Conduct Play a Role in
Promoting Workers' Rights?" in Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV, eds., International
Labor Standards.- Globalization, Trade, and Public Policy (Stanford: Stanford Law and Policy,
2003) 207.
26 See "Trade Union Councils and Networks Within Multinationals" (2000) 30 European

Works Council Bull. 7 ["Councils and Networks"]; Keith D. Ewing, "Legal Accountability of TNcs"
(2004) 11:3 Int'l Union Rts 8.
27 The European Works Councils Directive requires community-scale undertakings to
establish works councils composed of employee representatives for the purpose of informing and
consulting employees on a range of issues. See EC, Council Directive 95/45 of 22 September 1994
on the establishment of a European Works council or a procedure in Community-scale
undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and
consulting employees, [1994] O.J.L. 254/64. Internal works councils and committees within MNCS
have also emerged voluntarily, however, outside of the formal requirements of the EC Directive.
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The extent to which these private models of labour governance
have any real impact on the conduct of employers varies, of course, over
time and space and by company. There have, however, been enough
instances of MNCs addressing labour abuses in response to pressure
from consumers, workers, and shareholders that the normative impact
of these non-state forms of "global law" cannot be ignored in any
exploration of the emergence of a global labour law.28 A number of
authors have identified this trend. For example, David Trubek, Jim
Mosher, and Jeffrey Rothstein describe an emerging transnational
vision for industrial relations in the following terms:
This vision rejects the idea that regulatory possibilities are confined to the binary choice
between the national and the global and asserts that a complex regime can be
constructed by weaving together normative arenas at many levels and across borders,
and
deploying private rules, local practices, national laws, supranational forums,
29
international law in the interest of effective protection of workers and their rights.

Boaventura de Sousa Santos describes, similarly, the emergence
of cosmopolitan transnational advocacy networks of NGOs, unions, and
human rights organizations that aim "to counteract detrimental effects
of hegemonic forms of globalization" and which have evolved "out of
the awareness of the new opportunities for transnational creativity and
solidarity created by the intensification of global interactions."30
Teubner argues that a theory of "global legal pluralism" is
required to explain new forms of emerging "global law," and he asserts
that "global law will grow mainly from the social peripheries, not from
the political centres of nation-states and international institutions."3t
Harry Arthurs expresses similar sentiments when he suggests that the
enfeeblement of the state in the realm of labour regulation "may refocus
attention on local struggles, on indigenous, implicit, and informal

28 See Sabel, O'Rourke & Fung, "Realizing," supra note 10;Mary Graham, Democracyby
Disclosure: The Rise of Technopopulism (Washington: Governance Institute/Brookings Institution
Press, 2002) [Graham, Democrac]; Mary Graham, "Regulation by Shaming" Atlantic Monthly
285:4 (April 2000) 34 [Graham, "Shaming"]; Dickerson, supra note 1; Janelle Diller, "On the
Possibilities and Limitations of NGO Participation in International Law and its Processes:
Corporate Applications" (2001) 95 Am. Soc. Int'l Proc. 304; and Konrad Yakabuski, "Ethical Tack
Pays for Gilden" The Globe andMail(7 December 2005) B2.
29 Trubek, Mosher & Rothstein, supra note 14 at 1193. See also Teubner, "Global
Bukowina," supra note 24; Arthurs, "Collective Labour Law," supra note 17.
3
Santos, supra note 13 at 263.

" Teubner, "Global Bukowina," supra note 24 at 7.
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lawmaking, on movements which have not become juridified but which
actually draw their strength and sustenance from grass-roots
involvement."3 2 In these visions for a new global normative order in
labour law, the state is not situated at the hub of the regulatory wheel,
but rather as one actor in a pluralistic environment of state and nonstate normative regimes.
This pluralist vision of an emerging global labour law affords a
substantial role for non-state actors such as unions, consumers,
investors, religious groups, and human rights activists and organizations.
It encourages an exploration of forms of state regulation that might
facilitate the creation of labour practice norms through indirect means.
This role is not entirely a new one for many states. The labour law
systems of most advanced economic states have long relied upon
indirect forms of regulation, the most obvious being the institution of
collective bargaining.3 3 Collective bargaining law encourages employers
and workers to negotiate their own web of rules, but does so by
establishing a framework designed to alter the relative bargaining power
of the parties. The ILO's core conventions on freedom of association, the
right to organize, and collective bargaining34 promote a similar steering
role for states in the governance of domestic employment relations. The
challenge considered here is how state-based regulation can influence
the development of global, pluralist models of normative labour
practices applicable to corporations beyond the borders of the
regulating state.
The crucial role 'of the state in ensuring that the appropriate
national frameworks are .in place to support emerging global legal

32

Arthurs, "Without the State," supra note 14 at 45. See also Hepple, "New Approaches,"
supra note 14 at 363; Blackett, supra note 14; Robert O'Brien, "NGOs, Global Civil Society and
Global Economic Regulation" in Picciotto & Mayne, supra note 25, 257; and the Report of the
Director-General of the International Labour Organization to the 8 5 th Session of the International
Labour Conference (1997), in which he urged the ILO to consider the "the mobilization of nongovernmental actors," including businesses, consumers, and retailers, as a result of the difficulties
some states have in complying with ILO Conventions in the face of regulatory competition for
capital (ibid.at 27).
' See Teubner, "Reflexive Elements," supra note 9; Jill Murray, "The Sound of One Hand
Clapping?: The 'Ratcheting Labour Standards' Proposal and International Labour Law" (2001) 14
Austl. J. of Lab. L. 306; and Harry Arthurs, "The Law of the Shop: The Debate Over Industrial
Pluralism" (1985) 38 Curr. Leg. Probs. 83.
'4 Convention 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Unionize (1948);
and Convention 98, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (1949).
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orders has been noted in other contexts, most notably with regard to lex
mercatoria and international commercial arbitration.35 State law can
encourage an emerging global system of private commercial law by
ensuring that foreign arbitration awards are enforceable in domestic
courts. Here, the state fosters private forms of global "self-regulation."
Is there a comparable role for the state in the development.of a private
legal order governing global labour rights? Certainly, some advanced
economic states can influence foreign labour practices by conditioning
trade privileges on the establishment and enforcement of specified
standards. The U.S. and European Generalized System of Preferences
are obvious examples. These mechanisms have influenced positive
developments in labour practices within some states by creating an
incentive for foreign states and employers to improve those practices
"voluntarily."36
This article considers a different sort of tactic with overlapping
objectives. The focus here is on using domestic regulation to empower
foreign indigenous movements, including workers' and labour
movements, as well as foreign governments, to enable them to develop
more localized countervailing strategies to mobile global capital. This
approach requires the state to identify forces that influence the key
interactions between the industrial relations actors that shape normative
labour practices in foreign states, and then to use domestic regulation to
activate, agitate, intensify, or reinforce those forces. It challenges us to
examine how state law might engage private actors (such as NGOs,
human rights groups, consumer groups, investors, religious groups) that
have not historically participated directly in the formation of normative
models of labour standards. This challenge leads the labour lawyer into
unfamiliar territory. What is needed is an approach to regulation that
recognizes the norm-creating potential of complex interactions between

' See Wai, supra note 13; Gralf-Peter Caliess, "Reflexive Transnational Law: The
Privatization of Civil Law and the Civilisatiori of Private Law" (2002) 23 Zeitschrift fur
Rechtssoziologic 185, online: <http://www.luciusveriag.com/zeitschriften/ztschrrechtssoziologie/
zeitschriftfuerrechtssoziologie_2_2002.htm>; Teubner, "Global Bukowina," supra note 24; and
Reza Banakar, "Reflexive Legitimacy in International Arbitration" in Volkmar Gessner & Ali Cem
Budak, eds., Emerging Legal Certainlty. Empirical Studies On The Globalization Of Law
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998).
36 Jeffrey S. Vogt & Lance Compa, "Labor Rights in the Generalized System of
Preferences: A 20-Year Review" (2003) 22 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 199.
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multiple domestic and international private actors. The most obvious
candidates are theories of "decentred regulation" or "reflexive law."37
II.

"DECENTRED" REGULATION AND REFLEXIVE LAW

A.

A DecentredRole for the State

The notion of a decentred state supports a pluralist vision of
regulation. 38 Regulation that is decentred, or responsive,39 or reflexive,
perceives for the state an indirect role in the governance of complex
social and economic matters, a role as facilitator and motivator of the
norm-producing potential of non-state actors. Decentred law involves,
then, the regulation of the "contextual conditions" of self-regulation, or
the "regulation of self-regulation," but with the instrumental intent of
achieving state objectives.4" It seeks to encourage the private creation of
substantive outcomes from the periphery of social and economic
interactions, by discovering ways to regulate procedures to influence
communications and bargaining by private actors.
Decentred regulation is often posited as a "post-modern"
regulatory theory, as a solution to the incapacity of states to regulate
complex social and economic problems in modern societies by means of
"command-and-control" (CAC) regulation.4' CAC is described in the
decentred regulation literature as the promulgation by the state of
substantive, technical legal rules backed by sanctions in the form of civil
fines or criminal prosecution.4 2 In presenting decentred regulation as a

"See e.g. Calliess, supra note 35; Ralf Rogowski & Ton Wilthagen, eds., Reflexive Labour
Law: Studies in Industrial Relations and Employment Regulation (Boston: Kluwer Law and
Taxation Publishers, 1994); William E. Scheuerman, "Reflexive Law and the Challenges of
Globalization" (2001) 9 J. Pol. Phil. 81 [Scheuerman, "Reflexive Law"]; and Benjamin J.
Richardson, "Diffusing Environmental Regulation Through the Financial Services Sector" (2003)
10 M.J.E.C.L. 233.
38 Black, "Decentring Regulation," supranote 8 at 104.
39
Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending The Deregulation
Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); and Gunningham & Rees, supra note 25.
o See Teubner, Autopoietic System, supra note 9 at 67; and Teubner, "Reflexive
Elements," supra note 9; Black, "Decentring Regulation," supranote 8.
"' See Teubner, "Reflexive Elements," ibid; Helmut Wilke, "Societal Guidance Through
Law?" in Alberto Frebbrajo & Gunther Teubner, eds., State, Law, And Economy As Autopoietic
Systems: RegulationAndAutonomy In A New Perspective(Milan: Giuffr6, 1992).
42 See Black, "Decentring Regulation," supra note 8 at 105-06; Robert Baldwin,
"Regulation: After Command and Control" in Keith Hawkins, ed., The Human Face Of Law.
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solution to the failures of CAC, "decentralists" find themselves aligned
with "deregulationists," those who argue for a retreat to a greater
reliance on market forces and individual employment contracts to
distribute economic and social outcomes.43 The two camps appear to
diverge, however, on the solution to the regulatory failure of CAC, at
least rhetorically. Decentralists continue to envision a strong

instrumental activist state, but one with a renewed focus on indirect,
procedural forms of regulation that emphasize self-regulation. For this
reason, some commentators have likened the decentred approach to
regulation to "Third Way" politics, which envisions a largely self-

governing

civil

society

facilitated,

enabled,

democratized,

and

state. 44

encouraged by a guiding
The reasons posited for the incapacity of states to regulate
through CAC vary. In its most radical form, the argument is a key
component of autopoietic systems theory developed, most notably, by
Niklas Luhmann" and Teubner. Others are less abstract in their
critiques of CAC,arguing that many social problems have simply become
too complex to regulate through a myriad of technical rules, and that
governments lack the expertise to regulate complex modern issues, such
as pollution, or the ability to enforce rules through sporadic
inspections." More recently, though, the notion of an enfeebled state,
which underlies most critiques of CAC in the decentralist literature, has

attracted the attention of writers interested in theories of globalization

Essays inHonour of Donald Harris(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); James Paul Kimmel,
Jr., "Disclosing the Environmental Impact of Human Activities" (1990) 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 505; Neil
Gunningham & Peter Grabovsky with Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing
EnvironmentalPolicy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); and Eric Orts, "Reflexive Environmental
Law" (1995) 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1227.
4 See e.g. Richard Posner, "Some Economics of Labor Law" (1984) 51 U. Chicago L. Rev.
988.
4
See Callies, supra note 35 at 189; Christopher H. Schroeder, "Third Way
Environmentalism" (2000) 48 U. Kan. L. Rev. 801; Hugh Collins, "Is there a Third Way in Labour
Law?" in Conaghan, Fischl & Klare, supra note 1, 449; and Anthony Giddens, The Third Way. The
Renewal Of SocialDemocracy(Cambridge:Polity Press, 1998).
4
Niklas Luhmann, The Differentiationof Society (New York: Columbia University Press,
1982); Niklas Luhmann, "The Self-Reproduction of Law and its Limits" in Teubner, ed., Dilemmas
of Law in the Welfare State, supra note 9, 111.
' See William Sage, "Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American
Health Care" (1999) 99 Colum. L.J. 1701; William Pederson, "Regulation and Information
Disclosure: Parallel Universes and Beyond" (2001) 25 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 151.
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and the law, and transnational governance.4 7 It is here, more so than in
the national context, where the limitations of more direct forms of
regulation are most visible.
A decentralist vision of regulation is the legal paradigm best
suited to transnational regulation. Scheuerman explains the basis for
this argument succinctly in the following passage:
The attempt to develop an authentically transnational system of economic regulation
dramatically underscores the Achilles' heel of the classical model of a solitary lawmaker
outfitted with the task of undertaking the direct regulation of a host of distinct social
activities. If the notion that the legislature can serve as an omniscient source of "central
steering" already evinced signs of decay within the confines of the nation-state, it risks
becoming fundamentally anachronistic given the unprecedented complexity implied by
48
the tasks of transnational regulation.

The indirect manner of regulation posited by a decentralist
approach to governance has been presented as a potential solution to
the challenges of transnational governance in a variety of areas ranging
from environmental regulation 49 to commercial governance" to
intellectual property.5 1
B.

"Reflexive Law" as a Paradigm for Influencing Foreign
CorporateActivities

The decentralist approach to regulation is associated closely
with the work of Gunther Teubner, and his theory of "reflexive law."
Teubner argues that law has evolved according to three ideal "types.""2
The first is "formal" law, in which the state "creates and applies a body
of universal rules" that are then developed by legal professionals who
employ "peculiarly legal reasoning to resolve specific conflicts."53
Formal law facilitates "private ordering" by establishing basic market

4 See e.g. Calliess, supra note 35; Scheuerman, "Reflexive Law" supra note 37;
Richardson, supra note 37; Orts, supra note 42; Black, "Proceduralizing Regulation," supra note 8
at 600; and Banakar, supra note 35.
4 Scheuerman, ibid.at 88.
49

Richardson, supra note 37; Orts, supra note 42.

5

oBanakar, supra note 35.

51
Calliess,
52

supra note 35.
Teubner, "Reflexive Elements," supra note 9 at 240.

5

Ibid.
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structures in the form of rules of contract, property, and tort. 4 Legal
as "referees," resolving disputes related to
institutions act primarily
55
rules.
these basic
As societies become more complex, formal laws become
insufficient to deal with their regulatory needs. A new paradigm,
"substantive law," emerges in response. Substantive law shifts the "norm
rationality"-the fundamental principles which justify the specific way
that legal norms should govern human actions 5 6-from "autonomy to
regulation":
The justification for substantive law is to be found in the perceived need for the
collective regulation of economic and social activities to compensate for inadequacies in
action, the law directly
the market. Instead of delimiting spheres for autonomous private
57
regulates social behavior by defining substantive prescriptions.

Thus, substantive law confers on the state the responsibility for
"defining goals, selecting normative means, prescribing concrete actions,
and implementing programs. "58 Substantive law is therefore
instrumental law; the state uses law in pursuit of specific social or
economic outcomes.
Teubner argues that as societies continue to grow in complexity,
they become increasingly differentiated into a variety of horizontal
social subsystems, such as the economic, political, religious, scientific,
and legal subsystems. These create their own internal norms and
discourses so that no one subsystem can communicate directly with
another or impose upon another subsystem norms produced outside of
it.59 This has profound implications for regulation, according to
Teubner, because it means that substantive, top-down, CAC-style laws
are destined to be ineffective since "[t]he differentiation of specialized
discourses within society precludes a simple hierarchical model of rulers

4

1bid at 252.

55

Orts, supra note 42 at 1255.
' 6 Teubner, "Reflexive Elements," supra note 9 at 252.

17Ibid.at 253.
-"'Ibid.at 254.
-9 Patrick Capps & Henrick Palmer Olsen, "Legal Autonomy and Reflexive Rationality in
Complex Societies" (2002) 11 Soc. & Legal Stud. 547 at 551.
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and ruled."' Thus, while the political subsystem can attempt to use the
legal subsystem to influence behaviour within other subsystems, the
results will necessarily be unpredictable and unstable because no one
subsystem possesses the knowledge and wisdom to predict how its
communications will be interpreted and acted upon by the other social
subsystems.6 1 Moreover, attempts to impose externally created norms
through legal regulation can result in what Teubner describes as the
"regulatory trilemma": indifference within the regulated subsystem;
damage or destruction of the regulated subsystem through "creeping
legalism"; or destruction of the legal subsystem itself through the
"oversocialization" of law.62

According to Teubner, the solution to this inevitable failure of
substantive law is to be found in the evolution of law towards a new
paradigm that he calls "reflexive law." Reflexive law recognizes law's
limitations as a tool for controlling complex social behaviour. It focuses
on the norm-producing potential of intermediate institutions between
the state and markets and private actors and seeks ways to mobilize, to

influence, to steer, to "irritate"63 those institutions so that they create
desirable norms and practices. Eric Orts explains reflexive law in the
following terms:
Reflexive law forsakes direct regulation and focuses instead on how law can rationally
structure processes and procedures-both of the legal system itself and other social
systems-in view of the complexity of society and its problems. ... Rather than trying to
regulate a social problem as a whole, reflexive law aims to enlist other social institutions
to treat the issue. Reflexive legal strategies look to influence the processes of
intermediary institutions, such as government agencies and companies, rather than
... [Reflexive law aims] to encourage thinking and
regulate social behavior directly
64
behavior in the right direction.

o "The 'State' of Private Networks: The Emerging Regime of Polycorporatism
Germany" (1993) B.Y.U.L. Rev. 553 at 556. See also Orts, supra note 42 at 1260.

in

61

Black, "Proceduralizing Regulation," supra note 8 at 602.
Legal Instrumentalism," supra note 9; and Colin Scott,

62 Ibid.; Teubner, "After

"Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State" in Jacint Jordana &
David Levi-Faur, eds., The Politicsof Regulation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004) 145.
63 Gunther Teubner, "Regulatory Law: Chronicle of Death Foretold" (1992) 1 Soc. &
Legal Stud. 451 at 463 [Teubner, "Death Foretold"].
4Supra note 42 at 1262, 1264.
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Reflexive law, therefore, seeks not to order specific social or
economic outcomes, but to facilitate communication between
subsystems and social actors in a manner that will lead to the private
creation of socially desirable norms and practices. It "attempts to guide
human action by redefining and redistributing property rights" 6 5 and by
compensating for "inequality of power and information"66 in society.
Whether law is an autopoietic subsystem characterized by closed
subsystems,67 whether law's evolutionary response to increasingly
complex societies means that reflexivity will necessarily become the
"dominant form of post-modern law," as Teubner asserts, 68 and the
extent to which CAC regulation is actually impotent as a modern
governance tool, are among the claims of reflexive law that remain
highly contested. 69 These debates tend to play out within the theoretical
domain of the state's capacity to govern behaviour within its own
borders. But certain claims of reflexive law appear particularly buoyant
when the target of state-based regulation is private behaviour outside of
the state's formal jurisdiction. In this context, for example, the claim
that CAC regulation has limited capacity to influence behaviour seems
less controversial. Moreover, reflexive law's prescriptions for indirect
forms of governance that can influence private conduct open new
possibilities for governance beyond state borders.
Two aspects of reflexivity appear to have particular relevance in
the context of the governance of foreign activities by a state. First,
reflexive regulation seeks to cause private actors to engage in selfreflection, to learn about and contemplate the negative externalities
associated with their conduct. This process may cause these actors to
make voluntary adjustments in their behaviour that are consistent with
the goals of the state. Second, reflexive law encourages lawmakers to
consider how to motivate and facilitate the creation of private networks
of countervailing power to existing powerful economic interests. It
' Teubner, "Reflexive Elements," supra note 9 at 255.
66

Ibid.at 277.

67 See Anthony Beck, "Law as an Autopoietic System?" (1994) 14 Oxford J. Legal Stud.

401; Capps & Olsen, supra note 59.
"Reflexive Elements," supra note 9 at 246. See e.g. Orts, supra note 42 at 1263, disputing
this claim.
69 See e.g. Hubert Rottleuthner, "The Limits of Law-The Myth of a Regulatory Crisis"
(1989) 17 Int'l J. Soc. L. 273. See also Teubner's reply to Rottleuthner in Teubner, "Death
Foretold," supra note 63.
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therefore welcomes the emergence of transnational networks of actors
that seek to build countervailing power to global capital, and challenges
regulators to explore possibilities to influence interactions between
global capital and these burgeoning forces of private antagonistic actors.
Both of these regulatory goals seem well suited to the challenge of
influencing the conduct of MNCs across state borders because the
manner by which they seek to influence is not confined by jurisdictional
boundaries.7"
III.

INFORMATION DISCLOSURE REGULATION AS A
TOOL FOR INFLUENCING CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR

A.

Information Disclosure and Domestic Corporate "Social"
Performance

The "tools" of reflexive law, or decentred law more generally,
include incentives, taxes, subsidies to intermediate institutions (such as
consumer watchdog groups), and other mechanisms to alter power
relations between antagonistic groups, including most notably for our
purposes, mandatory information disclosure.71 Corporate information
disclosure regulation is intended to cause corporate "self-reflection" by
injecting new risk factors into the management thought process. As
Louis Loss has so eloquently noted, in relation to securities disclosure
laws, "[p]eople who are forced to undress in public will presumably pay
some attention to their figures."7 2 Disclosure regulation can also be used
to mobilize and empower non-state actors and thereby to influence the
conditions of engagement within which these actors bargain with
corporations over issues of interest to the state. It encourages
corporations to adjust the behaviour targeted by the disclosure law in
order to minimize potential negative reaction by stakeholders that could
interfere with corporate objectives. In this way, disclosure regulation
may facilitate a climate in which it makes good business sense for

7

See Scheuerman, supra note 37; Calliess, supranote 35.
7 See Black, "Decentring Regulation," supra note 8 at 126; Teubner, "Reflexive
Elements," supra note 9 at 277; Orts, supra note 42; Richardson, supra note 37; Richard Stewart,
"A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?" (2001) 29 Capital U.L. Rev. 121.
2
Fundamentalsof SecuritiesRegulation, 2d ed. (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown & Co.,
1988) at 33. See also Louis Lowenstein, "Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You
Manage What You Measure" (1996) 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1335 at 1344.
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corporations to "voluntarily" adjust behaviour in ways desired by the
state.
The use of disclosure regulation as a tool for influencing
corporate practices is of course not novel. Financial disclosure has long
been a predominant regulatory strategy of the corporate and securities
laws of many countries, particularly the United States.73 Furthermore,
disclosure of risk information in the form of product labelling is a
dominant feature of consumer law in most states. 74 These types of
disclosure requirements are often justified in market terms: they are
intended to correct information asymmetries that impede the efficient
operation of markets. In other instances, however, disclosure regulation
is intended not so much to correct market distortions as to influence
corporate behaviour, including corporate social practices, such as
environmental or human rights practices. As Breyer noted over twenty
years ago, information disclosure regulation may be used to curb
undesirable corporate conduct by "bringing legal or moral pressure to

bear upon those engaging in

75

it."

An interesting example of this form of "social disclosure"
regulation is the U.S. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, enacted by U.S.
Congress in 1975, which requires lending institutions to disclose a racial
breakdown of loan recipients to discourage racially based lending
practices. 76 The best known examples of social disclosure regulation,
however, are those that target environmental practices. The U.S.
77
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, for

' See John Coffee, "Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System" (1994) 70 Va. L. Rev. 717; Joel Seligman, "The Historical Need for Mandatory Corporate
Disclosure Systems" (1983) 9 J. Corp. L. 1; Louis Brandeis, Other People's Money And How
Bankers Use It (New York: Harper & Row, 1967); Williams, supra note 11; Lowenstein, ibid.;
Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, InformationalApproaches to Regulation (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1992); and Mary Condon, Making Disclosure. Ideas And Interests In Ontario Securities
Regulation(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).
, See Graham, Democracy, supra note 28; Stephen Breyer, Regulation And Its Reform
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Sanford Grossman, "The Informational
Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product Quality" (1981) 24 J.L. & Econ. 461.
' Breyer, ibid. at 161. See also Lowenstein, supra note 72 at 1342; Merrit B. Fox,
"Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance" (1999) 62:3 Law & Contemp. Probs. 113 (1999).
7612 U.S.C. §2801-10 (1994). See also "History of HMDA," online: Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council <http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/history2.htm>.
-742 U.S.C. 11001 [Right-to-KnowAcd. See also the review of the European Community's
EMAS program in Orts, supra note 42.
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and requires

corporations to disclose the amounts of designated toxins released into

the community.78 The results are then compiled by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and posted on the EPA's website.79 A primary
objective of the legislation, according to Pederson, is to pressure
corporations that produce social costs in the form of pollution to
"consider voluntary action to reduce it."8
Mary Graham has described, in anecdotal fashion, how this
disclosure law caused one corporation to make "voluntary" reductions

in emissions:
The day it became clear that disclosure was a powerful regulatory tool was June 30, 1988,
when Richard J.Mahoney, then the head of Monsanto, made a dramatic announcement
on the eve of the first TRI reporting deadline. Mahoney said bluntly that he had been
astounded by the magnitude of Monsanto's annual release of 374 million pounds of
toxins. He vowed to cut the release of air emissions by 90 percent worldwide by the end
of 1992-news to the engineers at the company's thirty-five plants. A year later, when the
EPA announced first-year results for all companies, USA Today ran a special report
naming the worst polluters, and the National Wildlife Federation published a book titled
The Toxic 500. Such companies as Du Pont and 3M vowed to reduce toxic pollution.
81
Corporate shaming had produced results.

This short anecdote highlights two important aspects of
disclosure-induced reflexivity. Firstly, by forcing corporations to compile
information about their activities, disclosure laws may both educate and
encourage "self-reflection" by corporate leaders on matters that the
state deems important. Implicit in a legal requirement to disclose
information about one's activities is a duty to collect that information.
Disclosure regulation therefore forces self-referential fact-finding. If
disclosure of the information may impede the company's own goals78

Right-to-KnowAc4 ibid., §313.
' "Toxics Release Inventory Program," online: Environmental Protection Agency
<http://www.epa.gov/tri>.
' Pederson, supra note 46 at 151. See also Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental
Regulation: Law, Science andPolicy,2d ed. (Little, Brown & Co., 1996) at 624 (It was anticipated
by Congress that disclosure of the information would "enable the public to put substantial pressure
on companies to reduce emissions"); Shameek Konar & Mark Cohen, "Information as Regulation:
The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions" (1987) 32 J. of Envtl. Econ. &
Mgmt 109; Andy Gouldson, "Risk, Regulation and the Right to Know: Exploring the Impacts of
Access to Information on the Governance of Environmental Risk" (2004) 12 Sustainable Dev. 136;
and Mark Stephan, "Environmental Information Disclosure Programs: They Work, But Why?"
(2002) 83 Soc. Sci. Q. 190.
' Graham, Democracy,supra note 28 at 21-24.
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perhaps by threatening the firm's public image in a manner that might
influence sales or by increasing public demand for more direct forms of
state intervention-then it may encourage corporate8 2 leaders to take a
more personal interest in the targeted social practice.
This may lead to the introduction of better internal information
flow systems designed to ensure that relevant information is both
collected and conveyed up the corporate chain to responsible executives
83
and directors. This in turn introduces a form of internal discipline.
Subordinates or contractors directly responsible for the targeted
practices will reflect more carefully on their conduct if they will
ultimately be held accountable through discharge, loss of contracts, or
some other form of discipline.' For example, Edward Iacobucci argues
that mandatory disclosure of executive compensation levels and
methodology "disciplines" compensation committees and directors to
"carefully consider their choice of pay instruments" because they will
need to justify their decisions to shareholders, the media, and other
interested stakeholders.8" In this way, disclosure regulation may, by
indirect means, address problems in corporate culture that have
historically permitted or encouraged employees or suppliers to engage
in undesirable behaviour.
Secondly, various groups in society-including consumers,
investors, workers, and social activists-can use the information to
pressure corporations to adjust their behaviour in a manner desired by
the state. Disclosure regulation transfers to the corporate actors the cost
of collecting information that can then be used by antagonistic forces to
challenge corporate practices." This isparticularly important in the

8

2 Ibid.at 144-45.

Codes of Conduct and Corporate
Accountability: New Opportunities for Corporate Counsel" (1980) 36 Bus. Law. 11 at 24
could have a healthy internal effect upon that process causing
("increased corporate disclosure ...
management to approach corporate policy decisions with the realization that many will become
publicly available; accordingly, more corporate decisions will be arrived at with heightened
management appreciation of potential public impact"). See also Lowenstein, supra note 72 at 1357
(external discipline of financial disclosure laws improve "internal discipline" of managers).
83 See George W. Coombe, Jr., "Multinational

' See comments of Gunningham & Rees, supra note 25 at 382.
'Edward M. lacobucci, "The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation" (1998) 48
U.T.L.J. 489 at 501.
1 See e.g. ibid.at 497-98 (mandatory disclosure of executive compensation lowers the cost
to shareholders of collecting the information and thereby facilitates shareholder activism aimed at
influencing compensation practices).
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context of efforts to influence corporate practices in foreign
jurisdictions, because the cost of collecting information about those
practices will often prove prohibitively expensive for most non-state
actors. Access to information about the conduct of powerful actors may
expose vulnerabilities and thereby alter power dynamics in bargaining
between various private actors.8 7
For example, Graham and Andy Gouldson have both
documented the work of environmental groups that have used
information obtained pursuant to environmental disclosure laws to
expose and publicly shame the worst corporate polluters. 88 These studies
are supported by a recent report of the EPA, which documents the range
and activities of private actors who use the toxins release information to
campaign against, and sometimes work with, corporations to identify
ways to improve environmental performance.89 Benjamin Richardson
argues for mandatory disclosure of global environmental practices in
order to empower and encourage environmental activism by financial
service providers and investors.9" 'Similarly, Iacobucci argues that
executive compensation disclosure laws "encourage investor activism"
and, in particular, encourage institutional investors to build public
reputations for careful monitoring of compensation practices.9 1 Each of
these arguments shares the central premise that disclosure regulation
can have important normative influence on corporate behaviour by
empowering private actors to act as monitors of corporate conduct.

87 Cass R. Sunstein, "Information Regulation and Informational Standing: Atkins and
Beyond" (1999) U. Pa. L. Rev. 613 at 619; Teubner, "Reflexive Elements," supra note 9 at 277;
Werner Antweiler & Kathryn Harrison, "Toxic Release Inventories and Green Consumerism:
Empirical Evidence from Canada" (2003) 36 C. J. Econ. 495 at 496; Richardson, supra note 37 at
261; and lacobucci, ibid.
88
Graham, Democracy,supranote 28; Gouldson, supranote 80.

s Environmental Protection Agency Toxics Release Inventory Program, "How Are The
Toxics Release Inventory Data Used" (2003), online: United States Environmental Protection
Agency <http://www.epa.gov/tri>.
0Supra note 37 at 261.
91 Supra note 85 at 501.

20051
B.

Who Made That?
Domestic Information Disclosure Regulation
Regulation of ForeignActivities

and the

A notable characteristic of disclosure regulation is that its
product, information, cannot easily be constrained by national borders.
As Graham notes, disclosure regulation creates "the potential for
impacts that are not circumscribed by state or national boundaries.
Information required in one jurisdiction becomes available everywhere,
unimpeded by political or geographical barriers." Moreover, access to
this information is today often instantaneous: anyone with Internet
access can obtain information posted there. This feature of modern
society has obvious implications for the governance of multinational
actors.93
Individuals and organizations scattered across the globe can now
share and distribute information about corporate behaviour
instantaneously. 94 The Internet can both facilitate and empower local
and global networks of actors in their campaigns to pressure MNCs and
their many suppliers to address labour practice issues. Thus, a
requirement to disclose information that is not otherwise easily
obtainable can both empower local advocacy movements in host states,
and also facilitate transnational advocacy networks that share with local
movements the objective of pressuring MNCS to improve labour
practices within their global supply chains.
Consider, for example, recent proposals by a coalition of labour,
environmental, and human rights organizations known as the
International Right to Know Campaign (IRKC). 95 IRKC has proposed
that existing U.S. environmental disclosure laws apply to all foreign

'Graham, Democracy,supra note 28 at 11.
Scheuerman, "High-Speed Economy," supra note 15.
4For consideration of how labour organizations are using the Internet in campaigns to
improve labour practices, see Eric Lee, The Labor Movement and the Internet: The New
Internationalism(Chicago: Pluto Press, 1997); W.J. Diamond & R.B. Freeman, "Will Unionism
Prosper in Cyberspace?: The Promise of the Internet for Employee Organization" (2002) 40:3 Brit.
J. Indus. Rel. 569; and Arthur B. Shostak, "Today's Unions as Tomorrow's CyberUnions: Labor's
Newest Hope" (2002) 23 J. Lab. Res. 237.
' See International Right to Know Campaign (IRKC) "List of Affiliates," on file with
author. See also the website of the Global Corporate Sunshine Group, online:
<http://www.corporatesunshine.org/>, which argues for greater disclosure of foreign corporate
social and environmental conduct within the scheme of securities disclosure laws. On this latter
approach, see Williams, supra note 11.
93
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96
operations of U.S. MNCs in addition to domestic operations. The IRKC
points to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as an example of the
successful use of domestic disclosure regulation to influence foreign
practices of MNCS.97 That legislation creates offences for bribery of
a
foreign officials by MNCs and relies for its enforcement largely upon 98
statute.
the
in
requirements
series of accounting and reporting
Disclosure regulation that targets foreign practices, such as that
proposed by IRKC, would have obvious reflexive attributes.
Like its domestically-targeted counterpart, such a regulation
would require MNCs to introduce information-gathering processes.
Labour practices information would be compiled, reviewed, and
ultimately disclosed by corporate officials, who would seek to prevent or
at least minimize negative reaction by the public, the state, or their
business partners. This aspect of reflexivity should not be
underestimated. Many MNCs deny knowledge of the labour practices of
their foreign suppliers. For example, in response to ETAG's proposal for
mandatory disclosure of factory locations, the Retail Council of Canada
99
asserted that "tracking clothing factories is almost impossible." This is
a somewhat surprising admission, since it implies that MNCs and
retailers in the apparel industry are not only unaware of who is making
the products being sold to Canadian consumers, but also, by implication,
that they have no knowledge of the conditions under which those
products are made. Certainly this may be the case for some MNCs and, if
true, bolsters the argument for mandatory disclosure of information
about foreign operations because it identifies a failure of self-regulation.
A disclosure regime targeting foreign activities would oblige
corporations to introduce processes for tracking the many links within
their global supply chains, a useful management exercise and one that is

96 IRKC, "International Right to Know: Empowering Communities Through Corporate
Transparency" (January 2003), on file with author.
9715 U.S.C. § 78ddl-78dd3 (1998).
9
Commentary on the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct is voluminous. For recent treatments,
see, H. Lowell Brown, "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1988 Amendments to the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government's Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?" (2001) 26 N.C.J.
Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 239; Steven R. Salbu, "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to
Global Harmony" (1999) 20 Mich. J.Int'l L. 419.
' Sharon Maloney, spokesperson for the Council, quoted in Erica Johnson, "'Cut It Out'
Campaign focuses on sweatshop labour," Canadian Broadcasting Corporation(27 March 2002),

online: <http://www.cbc.ca/consumers/market/files/home/cutitout/>.
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necessary for any business seeking to be a socially responsible global
actor. 100
Additionally, the information disclosed under the IRKC
proposal could facilitate local and transnational activism designed to
pressure corporations to adjust. their conduct. Information disclosed
pursuant to a U.S. law requiring disclosure of emissions levels in
Colombia, for example, could be used by Colombian environmental
groups to pressure local officials to take action against the corporation
or to pressure the corporation directly. The information might also
facilitate links between environmental activists in other countries, and
other interested stakeholders who share similar objectives or concern
about the practices of a particular corporation. In this way, state-based
corporate social disclosure regulation has the potential to build
countervailing power to corporate interests by arming foreign
indigenous civil society groups as well as transnational advocacy
networks with potentially useful information that might otherwise have
been inaccessible.
IV.

THE
CHALLENGE
OF DESIGNING
DISCLOSURE REGULATION

EFFECTIVE

I have focused so far on the potential contribution of disclosure
regulation to the emergence of non-state forces that could influence
foreign corporate social practices. In this part I explore some of the
challenges that must be addressed by any effective disclosure regime.
Designing an effective, instrumental disclosure regime is tricky business.
Three challenges in particular need to be considered in the design of a
disclosure model addressing foreign labour practices: (1) How can the
state ensure that the information is presented in a manner that is
meaningful to the intended audience?; (2) How can the state verify the
information?; and (3) How can the state avoid unintended, adverse
effects arising from market responses?

o For example, some companies include in their codes of conduct a clause intended to
permit it to keep track of the identity of all subcontractors who perform work on the company's
products. See e.g. "Roots Workplace Code of Conduct" (September 2004), online:
<http://www.roots.com/new canada/html/aboutus/RootsCodeofConduct.pdf>,
which requires
that suppliers disclose to Roots Canada the "name and address of every subcontractor used in the
production of Roots garments and products" (ibid.at 1).
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The Information Disclosed is Not Meaningful to the Targeted
Audience

Advocates of corporate information disclosure from Louis
Brandeis forward have identified the manner in which information is
presented as crucial to the success of disclosure regulation.'' If the
information is not presented in a manner that is meaningful to the
intended audience, then disclosure regulation may have no effect, or
'1 2
worse, may cause people to become "less informed." This observation
is supported by a variety of studies exploring how consumers react to
product labelling initiatives.103 It is unclear what relevance these findings
would have in the context of disclosure of information about foreign
labour practices, but we can anticipate a number of challenges that will
confront designers of a system of disclosure regulation that relates to
labour practices in foreign states.
One obvious problem arises from the limited knowledge most
consumers possess about global labour practices. Consider, for example,
a requirement for companies to disclose to consumers the actual terms
and conditions of employment of a particular group of foreign
workers.'° Most consumers in advanced economic states will lack
sufficient contextual knowledge to fully assess raw information about
labour practices, such as wage levels or hours of work. How will a
Canadian consumer react to a clothing label that discloses that the
employees who made the garment were paid twenty cents per hour, and

o Brandeis, supra note 73 at 71; Breyer, supra note 74 at 163; Cass R. Sunstein, Free
Markets and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 337 [Sunstein, Free
Markets]; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Pildes, "Reinventing the Regulatory State" (1995) 62 U.
Chicago L. Rev. 1; Graham, Democracy, supra note 28; and Magat & Viscusi, supra note 73 at 186.
'0 2 Sunstein, Free Markets, ibid.at 284.
103Ibid. at 337-38; W. Kip Viscusi, "Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings
on Consumers" (1988) 43 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 283; W. Kip Viscusi etal, LearningAbout Risk:
Consumer and Worker Responses to HazardInformation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1987); and Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) at 33-38. See also Gouldson, supra note 80 at 142
(discussing the challenge of presenting complex environmental information in a manner accessible
to the public).
'04 Ayres has proposed that labour practices information should be "monetized" and
provided to consumers in raw form at the point of purchase as a means of casting the consumer as
the "ethical sovereign determining what level of compensation is fair." This proposal would raise
these issues directly. See Ian Ayres, "Monetize Labor Practices" in An End to Sweatshops?, supra
note 10, 80 at 83.
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worked a fifteen hour day in a non-unionized workplace in Bangladesh?
Are those "good" or "bad" conditions of work by Bangladeshi
standards? By South Asian standards? What is an appropriate
comparator? What "signal" is this information intended to send?
Without any context in which to assess this raw information,
consumers will filter it through their own personal knowledge, biases,
and experiences. For many consumers in advanced economic states,
whose experiences of employment conditions are limited to those in
advanced economies, raw information about labour practices in
developing countries may lead to a "gasp response"-a feeling that the
product was made in horrible, "sweatshop" conditions. "Ethical"
consumers might react by "boycotting" the product and purchasing
another product on the rack that appears from the information on the
label to have been made under "better" conditions.1" 5 But consumers
then face a daunting challenge: on what basis can they compare the
relative conditions of work in different cities, countries, and regions?
How will they know if the Bangladeshi worker is really being treated
more unfairly than a worker earning a slightly higher hourly pay in
Lesotho? Finally, regardless of which product they choose to purchase,
consumers will have no way of knowing how their decision will
ultimately affect the workers; they may be rewarding a good employer,
or contributing to circumstances that lead poorly paid workers into even
greater desperation, or both.
From a regulatory perspective, then, is this disclosure model
successful? The answer depends on what one perceives to have been the

" The manner and extent to which consumer purchasing decisions are influenced by
information about labour practices is a matter of ongoing empirical debate. See e.g. Monica Prasad
et al., "Consumers of the World Unite: A Market-Based Response to Sweatshops" (2004) 29:3 Lab.
Stud. J. 57 (nearly 1/4 of consumers were willing to pay up to 40 per cent more for a pair of socks
with a label indicating that they were made under good working conditions); Richard B. Freeman,
"What Role for Labor Standards in the Global Economy" (12 November 1998), online: National
Bureau
of
Economic
Research
<http://www.nber.org/-freeman/Papers%20on%20RBF
%20website/un-stan.pdf> at 6 (approximately 80 per cent of respondents indicated that they would
not buy products made under poor working conditions if this information were known); University
of Marymount Center for Ethical Concerns, "New Marymount University Survey Warns
Manufacturers/Retailers: Consumers Don't Want Sweatshop Goods" (November 1999), online:
<http://www.marymount.edu/news/garmentstudy/overview.html> (approximately 75 per cent of
respondents indicated they would avoid shopping at a retailer known to sell products made in
"sweatshop" conditions); and Environics International, "Millennium Study" (1999), on file with
author (51 per cent of respondents claimed to have "punished" a corporation during the previous
year for poor social practices).
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objective. If the goal is to provide consumers with more information on
which to base buying decisions, the regulation might be considered a
success, and leaving consumers to sort out what the information means
may be justifiable from a market perspective. But if the ultimate
objective of this sort of disclosure regulation is to improve the: lot of the
world's poorest workers, then a disclosure model that provides raw
information about labour practices in developing states to consumers in
advanced economic states may prove detrimental. While such a regime
would possess reflexive potential, the response it evokes in the actors in
the various subsystems involved may discourage investment in the
world's poorest states. Those states, or more specifically, the workers in
those states, could be punished and relegated to perpetual poverty
because working conditions there offend the sensibilities of privileged
consumers in foreign states. MNCs, upon which those states so
desperately depend for economic growth, may simply decide to stay
away and avoid any controversy. It is difficult to discern any way in
which this result could help workers.
Models of disclosure that provide processed information to the
markets are an alternative to disclosure of raw employment data.
"Product labelling" schemes are an obvious example. A "green dolphin"
label might signal that a product is environmentally friendly in a more
effective manner than providing reams of raw data from scientific
studies. A "RUGMARK" label may satisfy carpet buyers that children
did not make the carpet, and relieve them of the need to examine a label
or website with the ages of the workers posted. A label indicating
"SA8000 approved" could come to signify to consumers that the
manufacturer complied with certain core labour standards, without
having to disclose detailed information about actual workplace practices
around the world." 6 The key aspect of these schemes is that an agent

0 The SA8000 standardized code is probably the most extensive certification model
applying to labour practices. The SA8000 model is inspired by the ISO9000 and ISO14000 series of
standardized quality and environmental codes although it includes more substantive performance
requirements based to a significant degree on core ILO conventions. The NGO Social Accountability
International certifies auditors to conduct audits of factories seeking to obtain SA8000 certification.
As of October 2005, 710 facilities had received SA8000 certification. See Social Accountability
<http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
International, "Overview of SA8000," online:
Page.viewPage&pageld =473>.
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383

that has credibility with the intended recipients must compile, verify,
and codify the information into a standardized format. °7
Although these social labelling schemes provide consumers and
investors with information that they can more easily interpret, they are
difficult to monitor in practice. Labour practices are not easy "facts" to
verify, particularly when the employment takes place in foreign states
with governments that are not keen on external institutions monitoring
local labour practices. Even the seemingly benign issue of the actual
wage rate paid to an employee by a contractor in a developing state may
be impossible to determine without interviewing the employee directly
or conducting a full forensic accounting of the employer's books,
assuming that the employer even keeps accurate records. Verification
becomes exponentially more difficult in relation to more complex
standards, such as freedom of association and the right to bargain
collectively. Even in advanced economic states with sophisticated labour
courts or tribunals, determining whether an employer has violated these
rights often involves lengthy and complex litigation. Was the employee
terminated for poor performance or for union activity? Did the
employer intimidate employees with the hope of influencing their
support for a union, or was the employer exercising lawful free speech?
Is the employer refusing to bargain with the union, or simply taking a
tough and uncompromising bargaining position? These are not always
easy issues to determine, even in states with strong labour laws and
adjudicative mechanisms. How then can we depend upon private "social
auditors" to decide these complex issues through occasional spot audits
and informal interviews? 0 8

107

For a more ambitious example of processed information labelling see Kimmel, supra

note 42.
,'The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) refuses to "certify" factories because of its belief
that it is impossible to determine compliance with labour practices by means of occasional audits:
Given that there are tens of thousands of garment factories nestled in dozens and dozens
of countries, it is impossible for the University to know with certainty that all factories
are complying with conditions set by the Code. Experience has shown that factories are
often "cleaned up" for short periods of time, but then return to significantly violating the
Code. One-time investigations often just cover up poor working conditions. Hence,
certifying "compliance" of an entire corporation or factory is ultimately impossible and
only extends the probability that the name of the University will be lent to companies
that are still profiting off of abusive working conditions.
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Therefore, any model that requires disclosure of information
about labour practices, even in a processed form, will run into the
problem of how to verify that information. A regulatory model based
solely upon the unverifiable statements of the regulated entity may have
some reflexive benefits, but is unlikely to garner much public support or
confidence. Third-party monitoring is an option, but, as I will discuss in
Part IV B, below, credibility problems and expense are challenges also
likely to plague a disclosure model that relies on private "social"
auditors.
Expense andMonitoring

B.

A common objection to many information disclosure models is
that the cost of collecting the information and monitoring compliance
exceeds the benefits of disclosure."0 9 With respect to a scheme of
mandatory disclosure of labour practices information, we can make a
number of general observations. Firstly, we can anticipate that with
respect to their own employees, the cost to corporations of collecting
the information would be negligible. Presumably, employers keep
records of this sort of information for their employees, so that the cost
of compiling it would consist primarily of the person-hours involved in
coordinating information coming in from various operations around the
world. Indeed, software programs such as Oracle-PeopleSoft are
specifically designed to enable corporations to keep detailed records of
employees and workers scattered across vast geographic areas."'
Collecting information about the employees of the many global
contractors used by MNCS may prove to be a significantly more involved
and costly process. True, many MNCs already keep detailed records of
information about particular suppliers, including quality, cost, and

See "Key wRc Principles" (10 August 2001), online: <http://www.workersrights.org/
wrcabout.pdf> at 1-2. For a more general critique of the social monitoring practices of one
prominent consulting firm, see Dara O'Rourke, "Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of ThirdParty Labour Monitoring" in Jenkins, Pearson & Seyfang, supra note 1, 196. See also The Gap's
"2004 Social Responsibility Report," in which the company acknowledges that violations of
freedom of association are "more widespread than our data suggests," owing to the difficulty of
monitoring this standard through periodic social audits. Online: <http://www.gapinc.com/
public/documents/CSR_Report_04.pdf> at 20 [2004 CSR Report].
1

"See e.g. Sunstein, Free Markets,supra note 101 at 137-38.
0

" See <http://www.oracle.com/applications/peoplesoft/hcm/ent/module/hr.html>.
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delivery times data. It would therefore not seem to be a particularly
onerous burden for the state to require corporations to record basic
conditions of employment applied by their contractors in addition to
those applied by the MNCS themselves. The MNCs no doubt have the
bargaining power to insist that the contractors provide this information
at regular intervals. There may, however, be significant discrepancies in
many instances between what the conditions of employment at a
contractor in a developing state are supposed to be-what the MNC is
told they are-and what they are in practice. Such discrepancies are
especially likely where the host state is known not to be diligent in
enforcing its own labour and employment laws, a common problem in
much of the Global South.11' Short of placing a monitor in every factory
at all times, it is a practical impossibility for large MNCS with sprawling
global networks of suppliers to monitor the actual conditions of
employment in effect when their products were made."' Canada
obviously cannot send inspectors to examine workplaces in Bangladesh
to verify the accuracy of the information provided by MNCS. Finally,
there is little reason to expect that the developing states themselves
would cooperate in a system of independent monitoring for the same
reasons that those states have tended to reject other proposed forms of
global or transnational labour law.
As a result, in all but those few instances where an independent
monitor has been able to observe or discover the actual labour
conditions associated with the production of a particular item, the best
information that a disclosure model targeting labour practices can
provide may be what the terms of employment were supposed to be at
the moment that product was being made, according to the terms of
written contracts or the contractor's or MNC's word. That information
might prove to be of limited value if, as is very possible, it fails to attract
broad public confidence. Worse still, the information could lead to the
public being misled about what is really happening in the workplaces. If
the regulation were to require MNCs to monitor the actual conditions of

...
See Blackett, supra note 14 at 403-06. See also David M. Dror, "Aspects of Labour Law
and Relations in Selected Export Processing Zones" (1984) 123 Int'l Lab. Rev. 705.
12 George Heller, CEO of the Hudson's Bay Company, advocates the creation of a retail
industry global database of suppliers and monitoring results that would be accessible only to
industry insiders. He argues that such a database makes sense because it is impossible and
prohibitively expensive for any one company to monitor all supplier factories. See Marina Strauss,
"HBC Executive Leads Drive to Stem Sweatshop Labour" The Globe and Mail(19 May 2004) B1.
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employment applied during the production run of every one of their
products in every facility on the planet, however, then the cost of that
regulation to the corporations would be prohibitive. Moreover, the
results of self-monitoring of this nature would likely be received with
suspicion in any event, because the corporation would have an obvious
incentive to report that the labour practices complied with local laws or
codes of conduct, as the case may be.
C.

Harmful UnintendedConsequences

A final challenge raises important questions about whether
information disclosure regulation and the market forces it seeks to
mobilize are appropriate tools in the pursuit of human rights, including
labour rights. 3 Critics argue that market mechanisms are too blunt a
tool for addressing labour practices because they are incapable of
recognizing and responding appropriately to the complexities of the
social, economic, historical, political, and cultural context that shape
labour practices. This is of particular concern when the consumer
markets in advanced states are engaged in order to influence labour
practices within developing states. Kaushik Basu argues that
encouraging consumers in advanced states to "sanction" MNCs for
perceived poor labour practices within their global supply chains is
misguided and "deeply unfair" to the workers who are the targeted
beneficiaries of the scheme, and to the nation state in which they live."'
The principal problem is that of unintended consequences.
Basu notes, for example, that if enough consumers boycott a
product that they are informed was made by child labour, this may cause
the MNC (or its supplier) to stop employing children or to stop using the
supplier that employs the children. But consumers have no way to
ensure that the impact of this is not that the children are thrown into
more desperate poverty or forced from the export-driven sector to the
indigenous sectors, where labour conditions are often worse, or into

n3 See Basu, "Compacts," supra note 20 at 493; Kaushik Basu, "The View from the
Tropics" in An End to Sweatshops, supra note 10, 59; and Ronnie Lipschutz, "Doing Well by
Doing Good? Transnational Regulatory Campaigns" in John D. Montgomery & Nathan Glazer,
eds., Sovereignty Under Challenge: How Governments Respond (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers, 2002) 291.
"4 Basu, "Compacts," supra note 20 at 493.
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prostitution. 115 Market-based
sanctions
can
also
result
in
disproportionate harm for the poorest of states. States that rely more
heavily on child labour (such as those in sub-Saharan Africa) due to
extreme poverty, lack of educational opportunities, or cultural norms,
will likely be harmed most if the supplemental income received from
child labour is lost while no alternative source of income is introduced
to compensate. The problem is that market-based responses usually
ignore the essential link between labour practices and the social and
economic conditions within the host state. Basu contends that policies
designed to improve these practices must address such broader
contextual issues. A boycott by North American and European
consumers of products made by children will not address systemic
causes of poverty and inequality, and will likely worsen the plight of
both children and their families.
Basu argues, therefore, that only the state has the contextual
knowledge and institutional capability to pursue systemic solutions.
Thus, he concludes that "the main agency for labor standards policy has
to be with the national governments, which can tailor the policy to each
nation's specific needs and context.""' 6 Others have made the same
point in different forms. Ronnie Lipschutz argues, for instance, that
"absent the political conditions within countries supporting workers'
rights, consumer choice and market pressure are unlikely to supply
them."' 7 These arguments recognize that fundamental transformations
in labour law require a strong, committed indigenous labour force aided
by a state prepared to support its efforts to improve local working
conditions by encouraging local countervailing forces to capital.
Initiatives that seek to influence labour laws in developing states by
invoking foreign market forces may overlook the necessary role of the
state in developing sustainable industrial relations systems if they focus
too narrowly on MNCs as the locus of labour practices governance.
Our attention is therefore directed back to the central role of
local institutions and governments, local struggles, and the voice of the
workers in the developing states. It is in these local interactions that
sustainable solutions to raise labour standards must be found and not in
" Ibid.at 491. See also Dickerson, supra note 1.
116Ibid.at

495.

117 Supra note 113 at 314. See also Guy Standing, "Human Development" in An End to
Sweatshops, supra note 10, 72 at 79.
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the trends and whims of foreign consumer and investor markets. This
does not mean that market forces and corporate campaigns have no role
to play in the emergence of a global labour law, but it may have
implications for the design and potential contribution of an information
disclosure regime targeting labour practices in developing countries.
Facilitating consumer and investor sovereignty by requiring disclosure of
detailed information about foreign labour practices may be the wrong
approach if the objective is to empower indigenous movements and
institutions within the developing states to build local solutions that
reflect local circumstances. A more restrained scope of disclosure may
be warranted, one which engenders corporate self-reflection through the
threat of potential market backlash, but does so in a subtler manner and
encourages local solutions by empowering private and state actors
within the developing states.
V.

DISCLOSURE
INFORMATION
GLOBAL LABOUR PRACTICES

REGULATION

AND

With these issues and challenges in mind, I turn now to consider
three recent proposals that seek to use mandatory disclosure of
information about foreign labour practices as a tool for improving those
practices. Underlying each proposal is the premise that mandatory
information disclosure may lead to an improvement in foreign labour
practices. Each proposal also accepts the fundamental notion that the
nation state can-and should-legislate disclosure of information
related to corporate conduct beyond the borders of the state.
A.

Mandatory Disclosure of Labour Practices Information in
SecuritiesLaws

The focus of disclosure requirements in U.S. securities
regulation is financial, that is, quantitative information governed by.
standardized accounting rules. The scope of required disclosure is
generally subject to a "materiality" test, defined in relation to the
likelihood that a reasonable investor would find the information
significant' 1 8 or that the information could have a significant effect on

'isSee Williams,

supra note 11 at 1208-09 (discussing the U.S. test of materiality); see also

TSCIndus, Inc. v. NorthwayInc.426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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share value." 9 Information about corporate social performance,
including labour or human rights practices, has not traditionally been
required by securities laws since that information has not been
perceived by regulators to be of significance to the economic
shareholder.
Cynthia Williams has challenged the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) focus on financial disclosure as an overly narrow
interpretation of the powers originally conferred on it. In particular, she
argues that the section 14(a) power of the SEC to require proxy
disclosure "as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors" was intended by Congress to permit the SEC to
require disclosure of all forms of information that would permit
investors to assess management conduct and competence. 2 ' Williams
summarizes SEC proceedings in the 1970s and 1980s in which attempts
were made by activist shareholders to demand that the SEC order
expanded disclosure of information related to environmental and
human rights performance. The most notable proceedings were the
various applications by the National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), in which the SEC ultimately accepted that it does have the
authority to order expanded disclosure of social performance issues, but
declined to do so because there was insufficient evidence that
shareholders were interested in information other than that which was
"economically material." 121
Williams argues that the investment market has changed
significantly since the NRDC applications were decided. Today, billions
of dollars are invested in so-called social funds and green funds.122 It is
therefore no longer the case that socially conscious investors represent
an insignificant minority. Moreover, she argues that it is increasingly the
case that poor social performance may have direct economic effects in
the form of adverse public reaction and costly lawsuits:

" See e.g. Ontario's SecuritiesAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-5, s. 1 (defining "material fact") and
National Policy 51-201, "Disclosure Standards" at Part 4 (defining "materiality").
120Supra note 11 at 1245.
121Ibid. at 1246-58.

'Ibid. at 1267-68 and 1288-89.
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As information about international labor practices, for instance, becomes more
accessible and as firms further distinguish themselves through price and production
values, compliance and non-compliance with international treaty provisions on labor
rights can be expected to have more profound financial effects, particularly if consumers
increasingly engage in
purchasing or boycotting products on the basis of the firm's treaty
123
compliance records.

Furthermore, Williams asserts, the manner in which a
corporation handles environmental and human rights issues, including
labour practices, is an important indicator of managerial competence
and philosophy, which are important even to the purely economic
investor. 124
Therefore, Williams argues that the SEC should require
disclosure of a large volume of social performance information,
including information about both domestic 25 and foreign labour
practices. In terms of the latter, Williams proposes that firms be
required to disclose, inter alia: information already required by the U.S.
equal employment laws in relation to domestic employees; average
hourly wages per job category and how those wages compare to the
applicable minimum wage in the host state; benefits offered to
employees; educational opportunities offered to employees under the
age of eighteen; unionization rates and the employer's conduct during
recent organizing campaigns; and a description of the host state's labour
laws. 126
B.

RatchetingLabourStandards

The "ratcheting labour standards" (RLS) proposal of Sabel,
O'Rourke, and Fung seeks to chart a course between what they refer to
as top-down regulation based on uniform standards and the
proliferation of voluntary initiatives to address global labour practices
introduced by MNCS in response to public protests. Thus, in its
assumption that states can not regulate labour practices by CAC
regulation, the RLS model rests on a premise similar to that relied on by
much of the decentralist literature. Here, the argument rests in part on

2

' -

Ibid.at 1282. See also Williams' comments at 1285-86.
1284-85..

124Ibid.at

' Ibid.See summary, ibid.at 1307-08.
126Ibid.at 1309-10.
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the incapacity of advanced economic states to command the behaviour
of MNCS outside of their own jurisdiction:
The most effective regulatory bodies belong to national governments, but the subjects
they seek to regulate are ...international, sprawling across the globe. At most, these
national authorities can enforce labor standards by rejecting goods that they identify as
having been produced under sub-standard conditions .... 127

The argument also refers, however, to the perceived
enfeeblement of all states to regulate employers by CAC regulation
within their own borders. The heightened need for global firms to be
flexible and the pressure placed on contractors to respond to these
demands will cause domestic employers to "violate externally
determined general rules.''12' Thus, states, and particularly developing
states, are perceived to be incapable of monitoring compliance with
fixed labour standards.12 9 Therefore, the RLS model is proposed as a
solution to both the threat of a global regulatory race to the bottom in
labour standards, and to the futility of CAC as a domestic regulatory tool
-inall states.
The RLS model is aimed at the "continuous improvement" of
labour practices within the global supply chains of MNCS. It would
accomplish this by promulgating four principles: transparency,
competitive comparison, continuous improvement, and sanctions. 3 ' The
principle of transparency
suggests a world
information they
standards, gauge
and even nations

in which consumers, workers, activists, and the public at large have the
need to accurately and confidently identify initiatives to improve labour
the results of those efforts, and compare successes of firms, localities,
3
against one another.1 1

The RLS authors argue for "full social transparency" of
information such as facility locations, wage levels, and health and safety
32
conditions.

27

Sabel, O'Rourke & Fung, "Ratcheting," supra note 10 at 7.

128
Ibid.
129 Ibid.

'°Sabel, O'Rourke & Fung, "Realizing," supra note 10 at 19-25.
-

ibid.at 19.
21.

132Ibid.at
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In an RLS model, firms would be "required" to adopt and
disclose a code of conduct, to permit independent audits of compliance
1 3
with the code, and to disclose the methods and results of those audits.
The results of these audits would be delivered to a new "super monitor,"
acting at the supranational level. This new agency would emerge most
probably from existing international institutions such as the World
Bank, the UN, or the ILO. The super monitor would process the
information received from all of the monitors into a uniform format that
would permit consumers to compare employers operating within
economically-similar states, and it would then disclose the information
publicly in some manner. This transparency would facilitate a
competition in pursuit of "best practices" between corporations intent
on winning the support of consumers, and a parallel competition
between monitors vying for auditing contracts. 4 In this way, the RLS
authors envision a "ratcheting" upwards of labour standards over time
as firms make continuous improvements in response to initiatives by
competing firms and lessons learned through experience. RLS would
thus create a "race to the top in which firms sought to outdo one
another in social performance, just as they now compete on more
conventional dimensions," such as product quality and price."l 5
The final principle of the RLS model is sanctions. The authors
argue that voluntary market pressures are crucial to the RLS model, but
concede that these private forces alone are insufficient.136 At the same
time, however, the sanctions must differ from "conventional regulation,
where firms are punished for failing to meet minimum performance
' Thus, firms that fail to disclose the information required by
criteria."137
the RLS model "should be presumed to have something to hide, and be
punished for violating" the principle of transparency. 38 Moreover "truly
recalcitrant firms" who fail to adopt measures "that have proven

'-' Ibid at 26. Precisely how corporations would be "required" to participate in RLS, and
who would require them to do so, are not specifically indicated by the authors.
'-4Ibid.at
35]bid

21-22.

at 24.
'36Ibid.at 25.
137ibid.
138

ibid.
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effective for their peers" should also be punished for failing to comply
with the principle of "continuous improvement."' 3 9
The authors argue that RLS would "generate a vast amount of
information that does not currently exist about how firms actually
perform socially .... ""0 This information could be used to pressure
corporations by an "array of actors," most notably "[hjundreds of
millions of socially sensitive consumers" who would base their
purchasing decisions on the information.' Journalists, activists, and
investors would also use the information to "shame poorly performing
companies.' 4 2 Firms would use the information to "benchmark" their
performance and learn to improve. And the information would fuel and
inform a wide-ranging debate on global labour conditions based on the
attainable best practices of participating firms. This model is obviously
reflexive in design, seeking to cause corporations to reflect upon the
treatment of the workers in their global supply chains by exposing
labour practices to market forces generated by an array of non-state
actors.
C.

MandatoryDisclosureof Location ofFactories

A more recent disclosure initiative was proposed by ETAG, a
Canadian-based NGO representing various labour and religious
organizations. In 2001, ETAG proposed an amendment to the
Regulations to an existing federal statute, the Textiles Labelling Act.'4 3
That legislation applies only to textile products sold in Canada, so the
scope of ETAG'S proposal is quite narrow. The Regulations require
corporations to disclose information relating to textiles sold in Canada,
including the types of fibres used in the product, the name of the dealer,
and, in some cases, the country of origin of imported products.1" Much
of this product information goes onto the product label itself, but
information about the dealer of the product (such as its company name

1 9 Ibid.

140Ibid.at

27.

Ibid.
142Ibid.
141

143 R.S.C. 1985, c. T-10.
4See Textile Labelling andAdvertisingRegulations, C.R.C., c. 1551, especially ss. 11-12.
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and address) can be obtained by accessing a "CA Number" for the
dealer, which can be searched on a government website. 45
ETAG proposed that companies be required to disclose
additionally the names and addresses of all facilities, including those of
contractors and subcontractors, where the product was made.'46 This
information would not be placed on the label directly, but would be
added to the information included in the CA Number system on the
government's website. Consumers would therefore learn of the new
information only if they sought it out, or were otherwise informed of it.
State enforcement would only be necessary if a corporation provided
false information, at which point the state could order the correct
information to be provided or levy a fine.
The stated purpose of the proposed amendment was to "strip
away the veil of secrecy that allows companies to hide their links to
sweatshop abuses" and thereby "make it easier for consumers to make
ethical choices when they shop."' 47 At present, only a small percentage
of garments sold in the retail markets of advanced industrial states can
be traced to their production source. The core presumption underlying
the proposal for factory location disclosure is that coalitions of NGOs
and labour organizations, notably including those from the host states,
could use the information to link MNCS to specific factories and to
interview the workers directly about how they are treated.'4 8 Thus, the
theory is that factory location information alone is sufficient to aid
burgeoning transnational advocacy networks in their efforts to build
information banks about contractors' and MNCs around the globe. In
addition, according to ETAG, the mere threat that abusive conditions
applied to workers within their supply chain could be publicly exposed
would encourage companies "to become more knowledgeable about
their supply chains, establish longer-term business relationships with

145 "CA Number Database Search," online: Competition Bureau
<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/
epic/internet/incb-bc.nsf/en/cpO1120e.html>.

146

See "Disclosure Campaign," supra note 12.

14" "ETAG Launches Corporate Disclosure Campaign," (February 2001), online: Maquila

Solidarity Network <http://www.maquilasolidarity.org/campaigns/disclosure/launch.htm>.
/48 See The Conference Board of Canada, "Study of a Proposal (and its Alternatives) to
Amend the Textile Labelling and Advertising Regulations," report prepared for the Competition
Bureau (February 2003), online: Competition Bureau
<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/
ct02546e.pdf> at 23.
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trusted suppliers, and better monitor labour practices in their supply
chains." '49
VI.

EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSALS

Each of these proposals contains obvious reflexive elements.
Each seeks to use domestic laws to communicate with MNCs in a
discourse recognizable to corporate leaders, namely, the threat of
market sanctioning by consumers and investors that could threaten
market share, revenues, and ultimately profits. The state is "decentred"
in the sense that it does not command substantive outcomes, but rather
seeks to cause "voluntary" improvements in normative labour practices
by mobilizing forces that will cause corporate self-reflection. I turn now
to an assessment of whether the proposals sufficiently address the three
questions that, as I suggested in Part IV,. above, must be addressed in
the design of an effective disclosure regime.
A.

ProvidingMeaningful Information

The ETAG proposal avoids the challenge of providing
information in a meaningful and contextual manner because no
conditions of employment would be directly disclosed under the model.
Information about labour practices might be disclosed to consumers
later, as a result of investigations undertaken by non-state actors at the
factories identified, but that sort of information is already made
5
available to consumers when corporate campaigns are initiated. ' Both
Williams' proposal and the RLS model, on the other hand, require

"4ETAG, "Transparency and Disclosure: New Regulatory Tools to Challenge Sweatshop
Abuses," submission to Public Policy Forum's National Consultation on Textile Labelling (30
20
September 2003), online: <http://www.maquilasolidarity.org/campaigns/nosweat/pdfIETAG%
%20Transparency%20and%20Disclosure.pdf> at 10 ["Transparency and Disclosure"].
t50 See e.g. Clean Clothes Campaign, "Made in Southern Africa" (2002), online:
<http://www.cleanclothes.org/ftp/Africa-report.pdf> (describing the results of audits of garment
factories in five southern African nations used by MNCS); UNITE, "The Gap's Global Sweatshop"
<http://www.behindthelabel.org/pdf/Gap_report.pdf#search=
online:
2002),
(November
'unite%20and%20the%20gap'> (describing the results of interviews with employees of a number of
contractors of The Gap); Yakabuski, supra note 28; Andrew Ward, "Coke struggles to defend
positive reputation-the world's most valuable brand has been tarnished by accusations over labour
abuses and environmental damage" Financial Times (6 January 2006) 21; and David Teather,
"Disney accused of labour abuses in Chinese factories" The Guardian(20 August 2005) 29.
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disclosure of labour practices information. This brings into play all of
the challenges we noted earlier.
The RLS authors address the challenge of how to provide
meaningful information by assigning to a new supranational super
monitor the task of assuring "the comparability of monitoring data and
methods" and generating "rankings" of employers and monitors prior to
dissemination of the information.151 This presumably is an attempt to
provide the consumer with a context in which to evaluate the
information. The information would be presented not as raw data, but in
a format that permits consumers to recognize which employers are the
leaders within a particular country or region, or to choose products
based on their learned trust of certain monitors. It is not clear precisely
how this would work in practice.152 In theory, though, using a central
body to process raw information into a user-friendly format permitting
comparisons of overall performance would provide more meaningful
information to consumers than a model that provides consumers with
reams of raw data about labour practices.153
Only Williams proposes disclosure of raw employment data
without. any formal intermediary processing. 54 But the raw information
would not be provided directly to consumers at the point-of-purchase. It
would go first to shareholders, most of whom would have a financial
interest in allowing the corporation an opportunity to take corrective
measures to respond to any abuses identified before attempting to
pressure the corporation through a broader, public campaign.
Moreover, prior to disclosure, the corporation would have an
opportunity to investigate how the practices in their operations
compared to general conditions of employment in the industry and
geographic region in which they were are located. The corporation
could then present the information in a format that permitted
shareholders to assess its relative performance. This could be a useful

'Sabel, O'Rourke & Fung, "Realizing," supra note 10 at 5.
152 Would consumers need to research the information on a website before buying, or
would the information somehow be made available at the point-of-purchase? The answer will have
important consequences for the effectiveness of the model since we can assume that most
consumers will not invest personal time to research these issues before making purchases.
'3 See e.g. Kimmel, supra note 42, who proposes that the U.S. EPA process environmental
risk information according to a standardized scale from 1-50 that would enable consumers to make
easy comparisons (ibid.at 537).
' 4Supra note 11. See also Ayres, supra note 104.
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exercise since it would encourage the corporation to identify "best
practices" in the industry within geographic regions. Other actors, such
as NGOs and union members, who may or may not be shareholders,
would also be able to access the information, and, if dissatisfied with the
corporation's response, use it to mobilize consumer forces against the
corporation. The resulting public debate might itself reveal a broader
context, within which motivated consumers could then situate the raw
information disclosed.
B.

MonitoringandExpense

A difficulty with Williams' proposal, however, is that it fails to
deal with the challenges of monitoring and expense in any detail.155 How
can the SEC and the shareholders know that the information is accurate?
She likely did not dwell on the problem of monitoring because she limits
her proposal for information to the direct employees of the regulated
corporation. The SEC would not need to deal with the more challenging
task of verifying conditions of work for persons who are employees of
suppliers in foreign jurisdictions. This limitation significantly reduces
the reflexive potential of the regulation in relation to complex global
supply chains,15 6 and exposes a potential limitation of using securities
law as the regulatory tool for disclosure regulation targeting global
labour practices. The link between the governance of the regulated
corporation on the one hand, and the relationship between a third party
supplier and its employees on the other, may appear too tenuous to
motivate a securities regulator to intervene.
The challenge of monitoring the information is dealt with head'
on by the RLS model, which would require MNCs to pay monitors to
periodically audit each factory that produces their goods. Many MNCs do
this already. The contribution of the RLS model would be to make this
process mandatory, and, as discussed in Part V B, above, to introduce a
155 Notably, unlike the others, her proposal would not require disclosure of names and
addresses of foreign operations, only that information be disclosed "per country" or "per facility" if
there are five or more facilities in one country. But even then, there would be no requirement for
the employer to name those facilities or give the address (supra note 11 at 1309). This is an
unnecessary limitation because it would not facilitate private monitoring of the facilities.
156 Many MNcs do not directly employ any of the workers who produce their goods within
the global supply chain. For instance, Nike outsources all of its production to over 900 contractor
factories employing approximately 600,000 workers. See Dale Neef, The Supply Chain Imperative
(New York: American Management Association, 2004) at 12.
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super monitor to process the results flowing in from monitors around
the globe. The need for this new supranational institution means the
realization of the RLS model is beyond the control of any one state and
therefore renders its emergence highly improbable. It is also likely to be
extremely expensive, since every corporation governed by it would be
required to retain monitors on a continuous basis to roam the globe
conducting audits, and somebody (presumably the corporations or
national governments, perhaps through funding to international
organizations) would need to fund the new super monitor. As a result of
these costs, the RLS model would presumably attract considerable and
sustained opposition from corporations. That is not necessarily a reason
to reject it, but it does mean that a broad coalition of state support
would be necessary for the model to emerge, since no single state could
impose these costs without encouraging a mass exit of capital to nonparticipating states.
In addition, the monitoring system in RLS faces a serious
credibility problem since the corporations and the monitors will have a
relationship of reciprocal dependence. The authors of RLS respond to
this dilemma by suggesting that consumer markets will force monitors to
act independently because only truly impartial audits will win the
approval of consumers. As a result, corporations will begin to choose
monitors that have the greatest public credibility. This vision is highly
optimistic. It assumes that vast numbers of global consumers will take
great care to sort out competing allegations about which monitors
provide the most accurate information about employment practices
occurring thousands of miles away. It further assumes that consumer
response will be so forceful and unambiguous that corporations will
scurry to hire monitors consumers prefer, even if the corporations
themselves lack trust in those monitors. In practice, much of the
inevitable (and already occurring) bickering between corporations,
monitors, and other actors about whether a particular monitor's
methods were fair and impartial will likely be received by consumers as
static, or met with sufficient indifference or uncertainty that no clear
message from consumers will be discernible, except perhaps in the most
extreme and obvious cases.
The ETAG proposal, on the other hand, avoids the problem of
monitoring almost entirely, and its cost would be negligible to both'
corporations and the state. The only data that needs to be provided are
the names and addresses of contractors and subcontractors, data that
the corporations likely already possess or can easily obtain from. their
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contractors or supply chain intermediaries. The possibility that the
information provided would be confirmed (or contested) by an array of
non-state actors creates an incentive for corporations to provide
accurate information. True, the proposal is not costless to corporations.
Apart from the costs associated with collecting and tracking the list of
suppliers, there is a legitimate argument that mandatory disclosure of
5 7 That is,
factory locations would create a "freerider" problem.'
Corporation A's competitors may seek to benefit from the investment by
Corporation A in the improvement of conditions in one of its supplier's
factories by transferring work to that factory. In that case, the original
investment of Corporation A will benefit the competitor at no cost to
the competitor, while perhaps leading to slower production runs for
Corporation A as the factory becomes busier.
The freerider argument is a valid one in some circumstances.
However, databanks that link factories to MNCs already exist and
continue to grow as corporations voluntary disclose the identity of their
factories for strategic, corporate social responsibility reasons or to
comply with NGO-led initiatives, and as labour organizations obtain
greater expertise in acquiring this information through investigative
techniques.' 58 Moreover, knowledgeable participants in the global
labour practices movement can already identify many factories from the
non-specific disclosure required by organizations like the Fair Labor
Association, which publishes violations of labour rights in factories by
nation in a format that identifies the number of employees in the
factory, the date of the audit, and the name of the auditor. In short,
there is at present an uneven level of disclosure about factory locations
that can lead to perverse results: those corporations that are most
transparent are also the most vulnerable to adverse campaigning if
labour abuses are identified in their factories. The ETAG proposal would
have the benefit of encouraging a fairer and more consistent level of
transparency.

' This is the argument made by The Gap in response to demands by NGOs for it to follow
Nike's lead by disclosing its factory locations. See Maquila Solidarity Network, "Codes Memo No.
19" (September 2005), online: < http://www.maquilasolidarity.org/resources/codes/index.htm > at 3.
of
8 See e.g. the website of the ITGLWF, supra note 2, which is facilitating the maintenance
a factory database by providing links to all factories that have been disclosed by companies and
multi-stakeholder initiatives. See also the factory database maintained by the Workers Rights
Consortium, online: <http://www.workersrights.org/search/index.asp?reset= 1>.
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Harmful Unintended Consequencesand State Sovereignty

Finally, under the ETAG model, markets are not the primary
norm-producing institution being tapped. The name and address of a
factory is itself a neutral piece of information of no particular value or
meaning to market participants. The ETAG proposal would nevertheless
likely trigger important reflexive responses in the targeted corporations
that could possibly lead to more beneficial outcomes in global labour
practices than more ambitious proposals requiring vast information
about actual employment practices (for example, wages, hours of work,
unionization rates).
The reason this may be the case has much to do with the
problem of unintended consequences described earlier. In Part IV I
noted Basu's argument that consumer and investor markets in advanced
economic states are incapable of effecting a measured response that
accounts for variances in local socio-economic forces in developing
states. Sustainable policies to raise labour standards require domestic
involvement by a strong state and by local actors, those parties that
understand the nuances of local labour markets. If we accept this
notion, that the most effective way to improve labour practices is to
empower local workers and local states to build countervailing powers
to that of global and domestic capital, then we must measure the
potential contribution of disclosure regulation by its ability to advance
this agenda.
Measured by this standard, a disclosure model that requires only
that factory names and addresses be disclosed has important reflexive
benefits. The fact that the location of factories would be public
information increases the risk to corporations of unexpected
investigations of working conditions at those factories by private actors.
The introduction of this new risk factor would cause some corporations
to take a more active interest in ensuring that abusive conditions will not
be uncovered there. For example, in its 2004 Social Responsibility
Report, The Gap acknowledged that it learns of many of the violations
of the freedom of association and discrimination requirements of its
Code of Conduct from NGOs and unions, and it claims as a goal moving
forward to "explore ways to integrate trade union and NGO insights
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more systematically into [its] monitoring processes." '59 The factory
disclosure model proposed by ETAG would make it easier for these
groups to conduct their investigations and to communicate their findings
directly to corporate officials who are in a position to respond. This
process would make it more difficult for MNCs to ignore violations
within their supplier factories, and would create an incentive to both
build a dialogue with local worker activists groups and take pre-emptive
measures to reduce the number and severity of violations being
uncovered by these private actors. In this way, disclosure of factory
addresses alone can create an incentive for corporations to engage in
self-reflection comparable to that created by regimes requiring more
extensive disclosure of actual labour practices.
More importantly, if the only information made available is
which workers made a particular product, and where and for whom they
work, then those interested in the actual labour practices at that factory
would need to investigate conditions directly or have someone else do
so. This process is likely to encourage dialogue with the workers, and
probably the participation of other local actors, like unions or social
activist groups, who speak the language of the workers and are most
able to gain their trust. Foreign private actors interested in how
particular workers are treated could build coalitions with these local
groups to help develop processes for collecting information on labour
practices. The threat of using foreign market forces lingers in the
background as an incentive for employers to behave, but the
information that would be conveyed to those markets would need to be
obtained directly from the workers involved. If those workers, or the
local institutions that help them, are sceptical about the intent or
possible effect on employment of a foreign-based initiative to gather
information about their labour conditions, then they can refuse to
cooperate in the fact-finding, or, at least, have an opportunity to
participate in how that information is used.
For example, workers might believe that their employer is
paying them too little and exposing them to dangerous conditions.
Those workers might be prepared to accept the assistance of foreign
consumers, investors, and activists if it could create pressure on their
employer to correct those problems. They may not want that "help,"

'-s

2004 CSR Report, supranote 108 at 20.
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however, if it' could cause their employer to lose a major contract, or lay
off dozens of workers, or close down and move to another location. An
effective, information-based campaign to influence consumers could
have that effect. The employees who are the targeted beneficiaries of
market-based campaigns must surely be involved in the decision as to
whether and when foreign market forces should be brought to bear on
their employer. If the employees are involved in the process of gathering
the facts about their employment conditions, and have a voice in how
that information is to be used, then they are more likely to have a real
say in shaping a response to those conditions.
Models that require corporations, or monitors hired by them, to
disclose the purported actual terms and conditions of employment at a
foreign facility are, in contrast, likely to bypass this crucial step of local
input into decision making. In the case of a proposal such as Williams',
the workers may be bypassed altogether and the information disclosed
might be based solely on the terms of formal written contracts, if any, or
(more likely) the word of the employer. If a monitor is involved, as in
the RLS model, workers may or may not be interviewed about their
conditions of employment. More importantly, though, under all schemes
that require disclosure of actual labour practices, the workers cannot
elect not to have their working conditions tested against the
unpredictable opinions of privileged foreign consumers. The decision to
subject their job security to the whims of foreign markets will have been
made for them, and usually by a foreign government, since even the RLS
authors acknowledge that many developing states would not voluntarily
consent to participate in RLS. 16 0
The RLS model is therefore subject to the criticism that it is
paternalistic. The opinions of local workers, activists, and governments
may be completely, ignored throughout the RLS processes.16' For
example, the outcome of the market process encouraged by RLS might
be a boycott of a product, even if the employees who make the product
neither wished this to occur nor thought that it would have any positive

1

oSabel, O'Rourke & Fung, "Ratcheting," supra note 10 at 16.

161 Ibid The RLS authors acknowledge that their model "possibly" interferes with state

sovereignty, but they dismiss these concerns largely on the basis that the many developing states
have elected not to protect the core rights of their citizens when, for example, they set up "export
processing zones" in which labour laws are relaxed or ignored altogether. They argue that states
should not therefore have a monopoly on governance of domestic labour practices.
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influence in their lives. The foreign markets in which the RLS authors
place so much hope could even decide that the workers' employers were
treating them better than needed, so that the response of the employers
could be to worsen conditions (to lower labour costs, worsen health and
safety practices, et cetera) This is because RLS rejects any base level of
labour conditions; rather than set out normative standards, it
encourages all labour standards to be determined by foreign consumer
purchasing habits and market forces.
A model of disclosure requiring only information about factory
locations envisions a greater role for the workers who are the intended
beneficiaries of these sorts of initiatives. Any campaign that emerges
from the information will almost certainly include the participation of
local workers and citizens, who may elect to seek support for their
domestic causes by soliciting the assistance of foreign private actors and
markets. The necessity of local input provides a greater assurance that
the needs of the local workers will be considered and respected in the
formulation of global strategies to influence labour practices within
global supply chains. A wealth of information about global labour
practices similar to that envisioned by the RLS authors could be
developed, but only with the involvement of the workers themselves. No
such guarantee exists under the other models considered here.
Finally, disclosure of factory location alone could actually
bolster state sovereignty. Full transparency of factory locations would
enable private actors to identify MNCS that "cut and run" in response to
exposure of poor labour practices by one of its contractors, or in
response to an attempt by one of those contractors or the host state to
raise labour standards. It would be possible to track the flow of supplier
contracts and to investigate what role, if any, labour practices played in
decisions to award and terminate contracts. 6 Coalitions of local and
transnational actors could use this information to pressure MNCs to
remain in a state, or to retain a contractor, even if labour costs begin to
rise or the employees of a supplier unionize, and to stigmatize those
MNCs that flee.
For example, in 2000, the Hudson's Bay Company ("The Bay")
was awarded the dubious distinction of "Sweatshop Retailer of the
Year" (it actually tied with Wal-Mart) by the Canadian NGO Maquila
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Solidarity Network. The principle source of criticism against The Bay
was its decision to "cut and run" from several factories in Lesotho after
learning of a variety of abusive labour practices in the factory. 63 In 1992,
a shareholder resolution put forward by two union pension funds calling
on The Bay to respect ILO principles throughout its supply chain and to
implement reporting requirements to discourage "cut and run" practices
by the company received a surprisingly high vote of 36.8 per cent.
Shareholders were met on their way into that meeting by protesters
distributing flyers and chanting "don't cut and run."'" While it has not
been possible to confirm a direct association between these campaigns
and the development of The Bay's sourcing policies, we can observe that
the current policy of The Bay includes a commitment to "influencing
change" in their supplier factories when violations of its Corporate Code
165
are identified.
If disclosure regulation could assist forces seeking to discourage
MNCS from punishing employees who seek to bargain collectively, or
from disinvesting in a state where labour regulations are being enforced,
then that regulation would make a significant contribution towards an
improved model of normative global labour practices. If the threat of
capital flight is reduced, if MNCS can be encouraged by non-state actors
to make longer term commitments to suppliers, then contractors and
host states may begin to feel that raising labour standards will not cost
66
them foreign direct investment.1
VII.

CONCLUSION

In terms of reflexivity, a model requiring disclosure only of
factory locations achieves many of the benefits of disclosure models that
are broader in the scope of information required, while avoiding many
of the difficulties that could plague those models. Moreover, of the
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See the various documents on the Maquila Solidarity Network's website on its campaign
against The Hudson's Bay Company, online: <http://www.maquilasolidarity.org/campaigns/
hbc/updates.htm>.
4 See Shareholder Association for Research and Education (SHAkE), Press Release,
"Record Numbers Support Shareholder Resolution at The Bay on Sweatshops" (23 May 2003),
online: <http://share.ca/files/news/02-05-23-HBC.pdf>.
165 See Hudson's Bay Company, Product Sourcing, online: <http://www.hbc.com/
hbc.socialresponsibility/sourcing/initiatives/ProductSourcing.pdf> at 2.
'6Lipschutz, supra note 113.
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three disclosure proposals considered, the ETAG proposal seems most
feasible from a purely pragmatic perspective. It is far less complex and
ambitious. Unlike the RLS model, for example, it does not depend upon
the improbable emergence of a new supranational super monitor, and,
since many MNCs have already been persuaded to make voluntary
disclosure of the addresses of their factory locations, it would provide
greater consistency, a more level playing field, and is likely to be
confronted with a less hostile corporate response than either the RLS or
Williams' proposal. 67
This is not intended to suggest that more extensive disclosure
models are not possible. States must be cautious, however, in attempting
to influence employment practices in foreign jurisdictions. Labour law
models depend on a strong guiding state that is capable of incorporating
local contexts into policy formulations, and on local struggles and
movements that can build countervailing power to capital. Market-based
regulatory tools are useful only insofar as they advance the interests of
local workers by altering the balance of power in domestic employment
relationships in their favour, and by facilitating a regulatory climate in
which the state is encouraged to regulate employment standards. It
cannot be assumed that foreign markets are capable of producing these
results. More research is needed in order to determine whether and how
exposing consumer and investor markets in advanced economic states to
information about employment conditions in developing states is likely
to aid in the emergence and support of these domestic forces. In the
meantime, a more modest proposal to require disclosure of factory
locations seems both feasible and potentially useful as a tool for
motivating positive self-reflection by global producers and for
facilitating burgeoning transnational networks that seek to influence
positive change in employer behaviour worldwide.

167

See supra note 1. Several Canadian retailers, including Roots and Mountain Equipment
Co-op, have indicated they would support a law requiring disclosure of factory locations provided it
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